Trade-related intellectual property rights and product versus process innovations
The incentives of southern governments to protect process and product patents are examined in a game with endogenous research and development and licensing. Patent protection results in the licensing of cost-reducing process innovations to southern firms. By increasing competition, licensing provides an incentive for southern governments to protect process patents. However, optimal patent policy may involve restrictions in the form of licensing contracts. In the case of product innovations, licensing does not occur regardless of whether or not patents are protected. Thus, patent protection serves to reinforce monopoly power without increasing technology diffusion. Southern governments thus have a lower incentive to protect product patents. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 1999
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Volume (Year): 27 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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