Kosten des Europaeischen Finanzstabilisierungsmechanismus (EFSM) aus deutscher Sicht
The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), which is supported by the German Gesetz zur Uebernahme von Gewaehrleistungen im Rahmen des europaeischen Stabilisierungsmechanismus (StabMechG), suspends the Stability and Growth Pact as the basis of the European Economic and Monetary Union. The actual ‘suspension’ from the ’no bail-out’ restriction (Art. 125 TFEU) and the prohibition of funding national debts (Art. 123 TFEU) transfers risks and financial burdens from deeply indebted states to solvent EU member states. As a result an unauthorized „transfer union" emerges, whose Central Bank lost its independence to a political leadership and cannot focus on its objective of price stability as contracted any longer. Even without the use of financial and guarantee aids the German economy suffers from a distorted yield structure and crowding-out effects of private investments. From the economic point of view the used measures are neither appropriate nor necessary for achieving financial stability within the European Economic and Monetary Union. Much less these measures are proportionate. Of course, the alternative of accepting a ‘controlled’ national bankruptcy would not have been without its formidable costs.However, its attribution of arrangements in the line with market requirements and the adherence to EU-contract provisions would have been the more worthwhile regulatory policy option for a more solid budgetary policy in the future.
Volume (Year): 231 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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- Lenza, Michele & Pill, Huw & Reichlin, Lucrezia, 2010.
"Monetary policy in exceptional times,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
7669, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ben S. Bernanke & Vincent R. Reinhart, 2004. "Conducting Monetary Policy at Very Low Short-Term Interest Rates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 85-90, May.
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