Wege aus der Verschuldung: Reform der Lohnpfändung / Getting Out of Debt: Reforming the Garnishment of Wage
Garnishment of wage as a way for creditors to enforce payment by unwilling or insolvent debtors, while very common in Germany and Switzerland, is not very successful. Based on a dynamic model of debtor behaviour, this paper explores two alternatives of reform. One is to reduce the rate of garnishment, which at present amounts to 100 percent of the wage income exceeding a defined subsistence level, thus probably destroying incentives to work. According to model simulations, reducing the rate of garnishment is likely to result in an increase of labour supply but a decrease of garnishment revenue per period. Second, the introduction of a debt release as it exists in the United States would have an ambiguous effect on labour supply. While providing debtorswith a fresh start, it would results a partial loss for creditors. A Pareto improvement thus does not seem to be possible. When taxpayers as an involved third party are taken into account, however, a potential Pareto improvement appears not attainable through debt release.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 222 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://www.degruyter.com|
|Order Information:||Web: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/jbnst|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Reint Gropp & John Karl Scholz & Michelle J. White, 1997.
"Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 112(1), pages 217-251.
- Reint Gropp & John Karl Scholz & Michelle White, 1996. "Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand," NBER Working Papers 5653, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dutta, Prajit K., 1994. "Bankruptcy and expected utility maximization," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 18(3-4), pages 539-560.
- Andreoni, James, 1991. "The desirability of a permanent tax amnesty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 143-159, July.
- Das-Gupta, Arindam & Mookherjee, Dilip, 1996. "Tax Amnesties as Asset-Laundering Devices," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 408-431, October.
- Arindam Das-Gupta & Dilip Mookherjee, 1995. "Tax Amnesties as Asset Laundering Devices," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 69, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:222:y:2002:i:2:p:258-279. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.