Tax Amnesties as Asset-Laundering Devices
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Other versions of this item:
- Arindam Das-Gupta & Dilip Mookherjee, 1995. "Tax Amnesties as Asset Laundering Devices," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 69, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
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- Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2003.
"Leniency programs and cartel prosecution,"
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- Massimo Motta & Michele Polo, "undated". "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," Working Papers 150, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2000. "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," CEPR Discussion Papers 2349, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Motta, M. & Polo, M., 1999. "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," Economics Working Papers eco99/23, European University Institute.
- Christoph Zaborowski & Peter Zweifel, 1999. "Getting Out of Debt: Garnishment of Wage in Whose Interest?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 207-230, November.
- Zaborowski Christoph & Zweifel Peter, 2002. "Wege aus der Verschuldung: Reform der Lohnpfändung / Getting Out of Debt: Reforming the Garnishment of Wage," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 222(2), pages 258-279, April.
- Motta, Alberto & Burlando, Alfredo, 2007.
"Self reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement,"
5332, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 23 Jun 2007.
- Alfredo Burlando & Alberto Motta, 2007. "Self Reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0063, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
- Bruno Chiarini & Marco Di Domizio & Elisabetta Marzano, 2009.
"Why Do Underground Reducing Policies Often Fail Their Scope? Some Answers From The Italian Experience,"
Economics and Politics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(2), pages 308-318, July.
- Bruno Chiarini & Marco Di Domizio & Elisabetta Marzano, 2008. "Why do underground reducing policies often fail their scope? Some answers from the Italian experience," Working Papers 8_2008, D.E.S. (Department of Economic Studies), University of Naples "Parthenope", Italy.
- Julio López Laborda & Fernando Rodrigo Sauco, 2002. "El análisis económico de las amnistías fiscales: ¿Qué hemos aprendido hasta ahora?," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 163(4), pages 121-153, December.
- Sandro Momigliano & Pietro Rizza, 2007. "Temporary measures in Italy: buying or losing time?," MNB Conference Volume, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary), vol. 1(1), pages 61-71, December.
- repec:eee:jeborg:v:155:y:2018:i:c:p:288-300 is not listed on IDEAS
- Garz, Marcel & Pagels, Verena, 2018.
"Cautionary tales: Celebrities, the news media, and participation in tax amnesties,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 288-300.
- Marcel Garz & Verena Pagels, 2017. "Cautionary Tales: Celebrities, the News Media, and Participation in Tax Amnesties," CESifo Working Paper Series 6795, CESifo Group Munich.
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