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Board Rudiments and the Executive Attitude Towards Corporate Risk-Taking

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  • Bello Lawal

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of key board distinctiveness on managerial risk-taking behaviour. Using a total sample of 121 firms made up of 1,166 corporate directors and 847 firm-year observations, the study finds robust evidence across the three stages of estimation that suggests power separation in terms of CEO non-duality is negatively associated with executive risk-taking due to enhanced board assertiveness and independence. Board size is inversely associated with the variability of market value measure both within and at inter-firm levels. With average board membership in the study sample made up of 10 directors, the study finds crucial empirical evidence that points to the key benefits of large board configuration including the social capital, diversity of thoughts, knowledge, and experience, effectiveness and vigilance which curtails executive entrenchment. In contrast, the paper records positive association between the presence of foreign directors and corporate risk-taking. Due to their wealth of experiences, foreign directors tend to have more strategic sense of purpose and are likely not to hesitate in taking appropriate risk decisions when it really matters. While the paper finds little evidence that suggests a within-firm positive relationship between board independence and managerial risky propensities, there was no evidence found to indicate that board quality and ethnic diversity affects corporate risk-taking.

Suggested Citation

  • Bello Lawal, 2018. "Board Rudiments and the Executive Attitude Towards Corporate Risk-Taking," International Journal of Financial Research, International Journal of Financial Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 9(2), pages 134-149, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:jfr:ijfr11:v:9:y:2018:i:2:p:134-149
    DOI: 10.5430/ijfr.v9n2p134
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    File URL: http://www.sciedu.ca/journal/index.php/ijfr/article/view/13240/8162
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    File URL: http://www.sciedu.ca/journal/index.php/ijfr/article/view/13240
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kevin Campbell & Antonio Mínguez-Vera, 2008. "Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Financial Performance," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 83(3), pages 435-451, December.
    2. Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb & Arun Upadhyay & Wanli Zhao, 2011. "The Economics of Director Heterogeneity," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 40(1), pages 5-38, March.
    3. Gantenbein, Pascal & Volonté, Christophe, 2011. "Director Characteristics and Firm Performance," Working papers 2011/11, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    4. Hutchinson, Marion & Seamer, Michael & Chapple, Larelle (Ellie), 2015. "Institutional Investors, Risk/Performance and Corporate Governance," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 31-52.
    5. Yermack, David, 1996. "Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-211, February.
    6. Gavin J. Nicholson & Geoffrey C. Kiel, 2007. "Can Directors Impact Performance? A case-based test of three theories of corporate governance," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 585-608, July.
    7. Paul Guest, 2009. "The impact of board size on firm performance: evidence from the UK," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(4), pages 385-404.
    8. Jiraporn, Pornsit & Chatjuthamard, Pattanaporn & Tong, Shenghui & Kim, Young Sang, 2015. "Does corporate governance influence corporate risk-taking? Evidence from the Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS)," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(C), pages 105-112.
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