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Internal Disagreement and Disruptive Technologies

Author

Listed:
  • Joshua S. Gans

    (Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5R 2X9, Canada; National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142)

Abstract

This paper models the adoption by established firms of internally disruptive technologies in that different parts of an organization stand to lose or gain from adoption. When agents disagree with a decision, they impose costs on the firm. The paper shows that any resistance to change that this yields is often accompanied by others who are aggrieved should change not occur. Thus, the firm likely cannot avoid disagreement costs regardless of whether they adopt the technology or not. In some cases, depending on their ability to impose costs, such firms may be more likely to adopt technologies due to internal disagreement.

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua S. Gans, 2024. "Internal Disagreement and Disruptive Technologies," Strategy Science, INFORMS, vol. 9(3), pages 267-276, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:orstsc:v:9:y:2024:i:3:p:267-276
    DOI: 10.1287/stsc.2024.0156
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2008. "Contracts as Reference Points," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(1), pages 1-48.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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