IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ororsc/v10y1999i4p439-459.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Strategic Flexibility in Information Technology Alliances: The Influence of Transaction Cost Economics and Social Exchange Theory

Author

Listed:
  • Candace Young-Ybarra

    (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, Orange, California 92866)

  • Margarethe Wiersema

    (Graduate School of Management, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, California 92697-3125)

Abstract

Utilizing a model drawn from both transaction cost economics and social exchange theory, we analyze determinants of strategic flexibility in a sample of strategic alliances involved in joint development agreements or joint research pacts. Findings indicate that, in general, determinants suggested by transaction cost economics provided flexibility in modification and inflexibility in exit. From social exchange theory, trust was found to be positively related to both types of flexibility while another component of social exchange theory, dependence, was found to be negatively related to the strategic flexibility of the alliance. Results also found that factors suggested by both transaction cost economic theory and social exchange theory were related to the concept of trust. Economic constraints as suggested by transaction cost economics were positively related to trust between the alliance partners while dependence was negatively related to trust. Additionally, the quality of communication and the existence of shared values were positively related to trust between the exchange partners. Results provide support for the role of determinants from both transaction cost economics and social exchange theory in the flexibility of strategic alliances.

Suggested Citation

  • Candace Young-Ybarra & Margarethe Wiersema, 1999. "Strategic Flexibility in Information Technology Alliances: The Influence of Transaction Cost Economics and Social Exchange Theory," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 10(4), pages 439-459, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ororsc:v:10:y:1999:i:4:p:439-459
    DOI: 10.1287/orsc.10.4.439
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/orsc.10.4.439
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1287/orsc.10.4.439?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-540, September.
    2. Henk W. Volberda, 1996. "Toward the Flexible Form: How to Remain Vital in Hypercompetitive Environments," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 7(4), pages 359-374, August.
    3. R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    4. Bruce Kogut, 1991. "Joint Ventures and the Option to Expand and Acquire," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 37(1), pages 19-33, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Reuer, Jeffrey J. & Zollo, Maurizio, 2005. "Termination outcomes of research alliances," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 101-115, February.
    2. Stienstra, Miranda, 2020. "The determinants and performance implications of alliance partner acquisition," Other publications TiSEM 7fdee0c2-d4d2-4f5b-95e3-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Jiang, Marshall S. & Chu, Rongwei & Pan, Yigang, 2011. "Anticipated duration of international joint ventures: A transaction cost perspective," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 175-183, June.
    4. M. Bensaou & Erin Anderson, 1999. "Buyer-Supplier Relations in Industrial Markets: When Do Buyers Risk Making Idiosyncratic Investments?," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 10(4), pages 460-481, August.
    5. Sexton, Richard J., 1991. "Game Theory: A Review With Applications To Vertical Control In Agricultural Markets," Working Papers 225865, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    6. Basu, Sandip & Phelps, Corey & Kotha, Suresh, 2011. "Towards understanding who makes corporate venture capital investments and why," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 153-171, March.
    7. Mantecon, Tomas & Liu, Ian & Gao, Fei, 2012. "Empirical evidence of the value of monitoring in joint ownership," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 1045-1056.
    8. Sels, A.T.H., 2006. "Foreign direct investment as an entry mode. An application in emerging economies," Other publications TiSEM 583ca9b5-1691-425d-8f77-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Chen, Shih-Fen S. & Hennart, Jean-Francois, 2004. "A hostage theory of joint ventures: why do Japanese investors choose partial over full acquisitions to enter the United States?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 57(10), pages 1126-1134, October.
    10. T. K. Das & Bing-Sheng Teng, 2000. "Instabilities of Strategic Alliances: An Internal Tensions Perspective," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 11(1), pages 77-101, February.
    11. Ashish Arora & Sharon Belenzon & Andrea Patacconi, 2021. "Knowledge Sharing in Alliances and Alliance Portfolios," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(3), pages 1569-1585, March.
    12. Christian Asmussen & Tailan Chi & Rajneesh Narula, 2022. "Quasi-internalization, recombination advantages, and global value chains: Clarifying the role of ownership and control," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 53(8), pages 1747-1765, October.
    13. Zheng, Jinming & Lau, Patrick Wing Chung & Chen, Shushu & Dickson, Geoff & De Bosscher, Veerle & Peng, Qi, 2019. "Interorganisational conflict between national and provincial sport organisations within China’s elite sport system: Perspectives from national organisations," Sport Management Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 667-681.
    14. Maurizio Zollo & Jeffrey J. Reuer & Harbir Singh, 2002. "Interorganizational Routines and Performance in Strategic Alliances," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 13(6), pages 701-713, December.
    15. Karantininis, Kostas & Graversen, Jesper T. & Rasmussen, Hans Jacob Nymann, 2008. "Relational Contracting and Allocation of Decision Rights in the Agri-Food Industry: Producer Contracts and Food Safety," 110th Seminar, February 18-22, 2008, Innsbruck-Igls, Austria 49877, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    16. Jing Zhang & Charles Baden‐Fuller, 2010. "The Influence of Technological Knowledge Base and Organizational Structure on Technology Collaboration," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(4), pages 679-704, June.
    17. Hagedoorn, John & Link, Albert N. & Vonortas, Nicholas S., 2000. "Research partnerships1," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(4-5), pages 567-586, April.
    18. Leeson, Peter T., 2005. "Endogenizing fractionalization," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 75-98, June.
    19. Haucap, Justus & Lange, Mirjam R. J. & Wey, Christian, 2012. "Nemo Omnibus Placet: Exzessive Regulierung und staatliche Willkür," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 27, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    20. Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz & F. Javier Casado-Izaga, 2005. "Spatial competition and the duration of managerial incentive contracts," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 331-349, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ororsc:v:10:y:1999:i:4:p:439-459. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.