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Reply to “Do Returns Policies Intensify Retail Competition?”

Author

Listed:
  • V. Padmanabhan

    (INSEAD, 1 Ayer Rajah Avenue, Singapore 138676)

  • I. P. L. Png

    (Department of Information Systems and Business Policy, National University of Singapore, 3 Science Drive 2, Singapore 117543)

Abstract

Returns policies are common in many sectors of retail distribution. Padmanabhan and Png (1997) showed that with demand uncertainty, a returns policy could improve manufacturer profitability under certain conditions. Wang (2004) showed that returns policies do not change manufacturer profitability when demand is certain and retailing is competitive. We show that returns policies do increase manufacturer profitability by attenuating retailer price competition when demand is low and intensifying competition when demand is high. Importantly, this effect holds only in the presence of demand uncertainty. Further, the conditions under which a returns policy raises the manufacturer's profit are weaker when retailing is a duopoly than when retailing is a monopoly. This suggests that returns policies serve both to manage competition and mitigate demand uncertainty.

Suggested Citation

  • V. Padmanabhan & I. P. L. Png, 2004. "Reply to “Do Returns Policies Intensify Retail Competition?”," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 23(4), pages 614-618, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:23:y:2004:i:4:p:614-618
    DOI: 10.1287/mksc.1040.0091
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Wu, Desheng, 2013. "Coordination of competing supply chains with news-vendor and buyback contract," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 1-13.
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    3. Lin, Danping & Lee, Carman Ka Man & Yang, Jilin, 2017. "Air cargo revenue management under buy-back policy," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 53-63.
    4. Steven M. Shugan, 2005. "Comments on Competitive Responsiveness," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(1), pages 3-7.
    5. Roland T. Rust & Tuck Siong Chung, 2006. "Marketing Models of Service and Relationships," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(6), pages 560-580, 11-12.
    6. Wu, Desheng & Baron, Opher & Berman, Oded, 2009. "Bargaining in competing supply chains with uncertainty," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 197(2), pages 548-556, September.
    7. Yoo, Seung Ho, 2014. "Product quality and return policy in a supply chain under risk aversion of a supplier," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 146-155.
    8. Wu, Jiang & Zou, Liuxin & Gong, Yeming & Chen, Mingyang, 2021. "The anti-collusion dilemma: Information sharing of the supply chain under buyback contracts," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    9. Yingxue Zhao & Tsan-Ming Choi & T. C. E. Cheng & Shouyang Wang, 2017. "Mean-risk analysis of wholesale price contracts with stochastic price-dependent demand," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 257(1), pages 491-518, October.
    10. Doganoglu, Toker & Inceoglu, Firat, 2020. "Buyback contracts to solve upstream opportunism," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 287(3), pages 875-884.
    11. Zhao, Yingxue & Ma, Lijun & Xie, Gang & Cheng, T.C.E., 2013. "Coordination of supply chains with bidirectional option contracts," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 229(2), pages 375-381.
    12. Anna G. Devlin & Wedad Elmaghraby & Rebecca W. Hamilton, 2018. "Why do suppliers choose wholesale price contracts? End-of-season payments disincentivize retailer marketing effort," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 212-233, March.
    13. Jeffrey D. Shulman & Anne T. Coughlan & R. Canan Savaskan, 2010. "Optimal Reverse Channel Structure for Consumer Product Returns," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(6), pages 1071-1085, 11-12.
    14. Ren, Minglun & Liu, Jiqiong & Feng, Shuai & Yang, Aifeng, 2021. "Pricing and return strategy of online retailers based on return insurance," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    15. Gurnani, Haresh & Sharma, Arun & Grewal, Dhruv, 2010. "Optimal Returns Policy under Demand Uncertainty," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 137-147.
    16. Zhao, Yingxue & Choi, Tsan-Ming & Cheng, T.C.E. & Sethi, Suresh P. & Wang, Shouyang, 2014. "Buyback contracts with price-dependent demands: Effects of demand uncertainty," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 239(3), pages 663-673.

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