Competition between Nonprofit and For-Profit Firms
This paper considers a nonprofit firm competing against a for-profit firm in a homogenous goods market. Given a stochastic demand function and an asymmetric tax schedule, we derive Cournot-Nash equilibrium allowing the nonprofit firm to have an altruistic preference toward consumer surplus or total surplus. The effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes are analyzed thereof.
Volume (Year): 1 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.ijbe.org/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Darius Lakdawalla & Tomas Philipson, 1998. "Nonprofit Production and Competition," NBER Working Papers 6377, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ijb:journl:v:1:y:2002:i:3:p:193-207. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Yi-Ju Su)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.