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Coordination of a socially responsible supply chain using revenue sharing contract

Listed author(s):
  • Panda, Shibaji
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    This paper explores coordination of a corporate social responsible (CSR) manufacturer–retailer chain by considering two cases, CSR retailer and CSR manufacturer. In manufacturer-Stackelberg game setting revenue sharing (RS) contract is used to coordinate the channel. It is found that CSR retailer’s perfect welfare maximizing motive resolves channel conflict, otherwise RS contract coordinates the channel. Wholesale price of RS contract is higher than marginal production cost above a threshold of CSR in one case and is negative above a threshold of CSR in the other. Also, CSR manufacturer’s pure profit is negative above a threshold of CSR.

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1366554514000532
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review.

    Volume (Year): 67 (2014)
    Issue (Month): C ()
    Pages: 92-104

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:transe:v:67:y:2014:i:c:p:92-104
    DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2014.04.002
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/600244/description#description

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