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Company Performance and the Two-Tier Board Structure: Empirical Evidence from France

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  • Ellen Rouyer

    (Department of International Business, Tung Hai University, Taiwan PhD Program in Business Feng Chia University, Taiwan)

Abstract

This study's objective is to assess the impact of board structure on company performance in France, where companies are allowed to choose between a one-tier or a two-tier board structure and to verify the specificities of companies with a two-tier board. To verify the specificities of companies with a two-tier board, we analyze 250 large publicly traded companies and find that the two-tier structure does have a significant impact on long-term performance, measured by Tobin's Q, yet no impact on cash holdings. Supervisory board size and the percentage of shares controlled by supervisors also have a significant impact on performance. Our findings are consistent with agency theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Ellen Rouyer, 2013. "Company Performance and the Two-Tier Board Structure: Empirical Evidence from France," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 12(1), pages 45-58, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:ijb:journl:v:12:y:2013:i:1:p:45-58
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    File URL: https://ijbe.fcu.edu.tw/assets/ijbe/past_issue/No.12-1/abstract/04.html
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Carlo Bellavite Pellegrini & Emiliano Sironi, 2017. "Does a one-tier board affect firms’ performances? Evidences from Italian unlisted enterprises," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 213-224, January.
    3. Rafiatul Adlin Hj Mohd Ruslan & Christopher Gan & Baiding Hu & Nguyen Thi Thieu Quang, 2019. "Accessibility to Microcredit by Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Malaysia," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 18(3), pages 287-305, December.
    4. Michel Sayumwe & Boudjemaa Amroune, 2017. "Directors characteristics and stock market performance in Canada," Journal of Economic and Financial Studies (JEFS), LAR Center Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1-15, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate governance; performance; board structure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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