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Management And Governing Systems Of Family Business From South Of Jalisco, Mexico, Direccion Y Organos De Gobierno De La Empresa Familiar Del Sur De Jalisco, Mexico

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  • Patricia Rivera Espinoza
  • Ezequiel Ramirez Lira
  • Enrique Roberto Azpeitia Torres

Abstract

The objective of this paper was to analyze the conditions in which family businesses from south of Jalisco, Mexico, process their administration and governing systems. This is non-experimental and descriptive research, based on a cross technique (Hernández et al. 2006), and nonprobability and convenience sampling. In 70% out of the businesses, the main shareholder usually acts as general manager. The dominant generation is the first generation, which is in charge of the company, 83% don´t have a board of directors. When it comes to a company succession 91% of the businesses note that the founder and main shareholder, as soon as he should die, wishes that in the future such company should be part of the same family. We conclude that family businesses from south of Jalisco generally do not have a directive board of professionals, since the owners themselves take the responsibilities for all decisions regarding the business development. These businesses are the family’s support. Very few have a formal administration board, which can be relied upon for business development

Suggested Citation

  • Patricia Rivera Espinoza & Ezequiel Ramirez Lira & Enrique Roberto Azpeitia Torres, 2016. "Management And Governing Systems Of Family Business From South Of Jalisco, Mexico, Direccion Y Organos De Gobierno De La Empresa Familiar Del Sur De Jalisco, Mexico," Revista Global de Negocios, The Institute for Business and Finance Research, vol. 4(2), pages 45-56.
  • Handle: RePEc:ibf:rgnego:v:4:y:2016:i:2:p:45-56
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Governing Systems; Family Businesses; South of Jalisco;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility
    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

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