Estimating Cartel Behavior: The Case of the Cement Cartel in Hokkaido
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DOI: 10.15057/30960
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
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