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Insurgent attacks, government protection, and international intervention

Author

Listed:
  • Kjell Hausken and
  • Ncube, Mthuli

Abstract

A government failing to protect against insurgents may or may not be rescued by the international community. Classifying events during 1961-2012, we find that among the successful interventions, war occurs more often than tension which occurs more often than that the government remains in power. Unsuccessful interventions are less common than successful interventions. When the government protects successfully, tension occurs more often than that the government remains in power, which occurs more often than war. Empirical tests show that the type of intervener matters. U.S. interventions tend to cause more successful outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Kjell Hausken and & Ncube, Mthuli, 2019. "Insurgent attacks, government protection, and international intervention," International Journal of Development and Conflict, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, vol. 9(2), pages 142-175.
    • Handle: RePEc:gok:ijdcv1:v:9:y:2019:i:2:p:142-175
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gordon Tullock, 1971. "The paradox of revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-99, September.
    2. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422.
    3. Andrew H. Kydd & Scott Straus, 2013. "The Road to Hell? Third‐Party Intervention to Prevent Atrocities," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 57(3), pages 673-684, July.
    4. Kjell Hausken & Mthuli Ncube, 2020. "Game Theoretic Analysis of Insurgent Attacks, Government Protection, and International Intervention," International Journal of Strategic Decision Sciences (IJSDS), IGI Global, vol. 11(1), pages 56-75, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    International intervention; terrorism; fighting; protection; incumbent; challenger; conflict.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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