Carbon Emission Efficiency Network: Evolutionary Game and Sensitivity Analysis between Differentiated Efficiency Groups and Local Governments

With its proposal of the “double carbon” (peak carbon dioxide emissions and carbon neutralization) goal, China has entered a new stage in creating an ecological civilization and achieving sustainable development. Based on the formation and evolution mechanism of the carbon emission efficiency network, in this study, a trilateral evolutionary game model—including efficiency groups (high- and low-efficiency groups) and local governments—was constructed, in an attempt to discuss the conditions needed for different players and trilateral interconnected systems to implement balanced and stable strategies. Furthermore, the sensitivity of the participants’ evolutionary trajectories toward factors such as the initial strategy ratio, transition cost, and network capital were tested via a system simulation. The main conclusions were as follows: (1) Efficiency groups form a virtuous circle when the initial proportion of the participants’ strategies reaches a certain threshold, and converge into a stable “win–win” state. Under these circumstances, high-efficiency groups tend to give full play to their efficiency advantages in terms of carbon emission reduction and green development, while low-efficiency groups tend to choose green transformation and accept the spillover effect from high-efficiency groups. (2) When efficiency groups achieve a “win–win” state or form good self-management, local governments move from active supervision to a passive supervision strategy in order to reduce supervision costs. (3) While different initial strategy proportions do not affect the stable convergence point of the evolutionary system, they have a differentiated impact on the convergence speed of the players. Under the condition of a low initial strategy ratio, transformation costs can reduce the green transformation enthusiasm of inefficient groups, while network capital can enhance the green transformation willingness of inefficient groups.