Optimal Strategies in Green Supply Chains When Considering Consumers’ Green Preferences and Government Subsidies

Green and low-carbon development of supply chains represents a practical approach to addressing climate change and enhancing corporate competitiveness. From the perspective of the relationship between policy subsidies and channel power structures, this paper constructs Stackelberg game models under four different scenarios to conduct theoretical analyses of the optimal strategies, supported by numerical simulations. The research findings reveal the following. (1) Under the product subsidy policy, the enhancement of consumers’ green preference will lead to a green premium, and in the case of the technology subsidy policy, consumers’ green preference will inhibit wholesale prices and retail prices. However, there is a threshold in the manufacturer-led case, and a “green premium” is also claimed when this threshold is exceeded. (2) The effects of the product subsidy policy and the green technology level subsidy policy on prices are opposite, where an increase in the product subsidy will increase the wholesale price and retail price, while an increase in the green technology level subsidy will reduce the wholesale price. The technology subsidy policy has a more significant effect on the promotion of green technology. (3) The power of supply chain channels will directly affect corporate profits, and the leader of the supply chain often has higher profits. Compared with product subsidies, technology subsidies can inhibit the channel power of retailers.