IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jijerp/v18y2021i4p2169-d504152.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

EU’s Ordering of COVID-19 Vaccine Doses: Political Decision-Making under Uncertainty

Author

Listed:
  • Werner Gleißner

    (Faculty of Business and Economics, Technical University Dresden, 01069 Dresden, Germany
    Future Value Group AG, 70771 Leinfelden-Echterdingen, Germany)

  • Florian Follert

    (Faculty of Management, Seeburg Castle University, 5201 Seekirchen am Wallersee, Austria)

  • Frank Daumann

    (Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, Friedrich Schiller University, 07743 Jena, Germany)

  • Frank Leibbrand

    (Institut für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung und Wirtschaftsberatung, 96135 Stegaurach, Germany)

Abstract

Worldwide, politicians, scientists, and entrepreneurs are operating under high uncertainty and incomplete information regarding the adequacy of measures to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic. It seems indisputable that only widespread and global immunity can bring normalization to social life. In this respect, the development of a vaccine was a milestone in pandemic control. However, within the EU, especially in Germany, the vaccination plan is increasingly faltering, and criticism is growing louder. This paper considers the EU’s political decision in general and the decisions of the German government to procure vaccine doses against the background of modern economics as a decision under uncertainty and critically analyzes the process.

Suggested Citation

  • Werner Gleißner & Florian Follert & Frank Daumann & Frank Leibbrand, 2021. "EU’s Ordering of COVID-19 Vaccine Doses: Political Decision-Making under Uncertainty," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(4), pages 1-12, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:18:y:2021:i:4:p:2169-:d:504152
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/18/4/2169/pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/18/4/2169/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Florian Dorn & Clemens Fuest & Marcell Göttert & Carla Krolage & Stefan Lautenbacher & Sebastian Link & Andreas Peichl & Magnus Reif & Stefan Sauer & Marc Stöckli & Klaus Wohlrabe & Timo Wollmershäuse, 2020. "The Economic Costs of the Coronavirus Shutdown for Germany: A Scenario Calculation," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 73(04), pages 29-35, April.
    2. Philipp Bagus & José Antonio Peña-Ramos & Antonio Sánchez-Bayón, 2021. "COVID-19 and the Political Economy of Mass Hysteria," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(4), pages 1-15, February.
    3. David R. Holtgrave & Elke U. Weber, 1993. "Dimensions of Risk Perception for Financial and Health Risks," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(5), pages 553-558, October.
    4. Emrich, Eike & Follert, Florian, 2019. "Totgesagte leben länger! Einige Anmerkungen zum homo oeconomicus als Methode," Working Papers of the European Institute for Socioeconomics 33, European Institute for Socioeconomics (EIS), Saarbrücken.
    5. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Frank Daumann & Florian Follert & Werner Gleißner & Endre Kamarás & Chantal Naumann, 2021. "Political Decision Making in the COVID-19 Pandemic: The Case of Germany from the Perspective of Risk Management," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(1), pages 1-23, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Florian Follert & Werner Gleißner & Dominik Möst, 2021. "What Can Politics Learn from Management Decisions? A Case Study of Germany’s Exit from Nuclear Energy after Fukushima," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(13), pages 1-15, June.
    2. Frank Daumann & Florian Follert & Werner Gleißner & Endre Kamarás & Chantal Naumann, 2021. "Political Decision Making in the COVID-19 Pandemic: The Case of Germany from the Perspective of Risk Management," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(1), pages 1-23, December.
    3. Sara M. Constantino & Alicia D. Cooperman & Thiago M. Q. Moreira, 2021. "Voting in a global pandemic: Assessing dueling influences of Covid‐19 on turnout," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 102(5), pages 2210-2235, September.
    4. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    5. Kaivan Munshi & Mark Rosenzweig, 2008. "The Efficacy of Parochial Politics: Caste, Commitment, and Competence in Indian Local Governments," NBER Working Papers 14335, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Burkhard Schipper & Hee Yeul Woo, 2012. "Political Awareness and Microtargeting of Voters in Electoral Competition," Working Papers 124, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    7. Marco Faravelli & Randall Walsh, 2011. "Smooth Politicians And Paternalistic Voters: A Theory Of Large Elections," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000250, David K. Levine.
    8. Eric Kaufmann & Henry Patterson, 2006. "Intra‐Party Support for the Good Friday Agreement in the Ulster Unionist Party," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 54(3), pages 509-532, October.
    9. Micael Castanheira, 2003. "Why Vote For Losers?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1207-1238, September.
    10. Mihir Bhattacharya, 2019. "Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(2), pages 225-246, February.
    11. Sven Banisch & Eckehard Olbrich, 2021. "An Argument Communication Model of Polarization and Ideological Alignment," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 24(1), pages 1-1.
    12. Robbett, Andrea & Matthews, Peter Hans, 2018. "Partisan bias and expressive voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 107-120.
    13. Peter Nijkamp & Marc van der Burch & Gabriella Vindigni, 2002. "A Comparative Institutional Evaluation of Public-Private Partnerships in Dutch Urban Land-use and Revitalisation Projects," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 39(10), pages 1865-1880, September.
    14. Vincenzo Atella & Jay Coggins & Federico Perali, 2005. "Aversion to inequality in Italy and its determinants," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 2(2), pages 117-144, January.
    15. Hibbs, Douglas A, Jr, 2000. "Bread and Peace Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1-2), pages 149-180, July.
    16. Alan Blinder & Alan Krueger, 2004. "What Does the Public Know about Economic Policy, and How Does It Know It?," Working Papers 875, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    17. Francisco Martínez-Mora & M. Socorro Puy, 2009. "Off-the-peak preferences over government size," Working Papers 2009-9, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    18. Asmae AQZZOUZ & Michel DIMOU, 2022. "Tax mimicking in French counties," Region et Developpement, Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var, vol. 55, pages 113-132.
    19. Ernesto Dal Bo, 2000. "Bribing Voters," Economics Series Working Papers 39, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    20. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09iepsg269m is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Andrea Baranzini & Stefano Carattini & Linda Tesauro, 2021. "Designing Effective and Acceptable Road Pricing Schemes: Evidence from the Geneva Congestion Charge," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 79(3), pages 417-482, July.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:18:y:2021:i:4:p:2169-:d:504152. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.