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Instability of Mixed Nash Equilibria in Generalised Hawk-Dove Game: A Project Conflict Management Scenario

Author

Listed:
  • Sheryl Le Chang

    () (Complex Systems Research Group, Faculty of Engineering and IT, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia)

  • Mikhail Prokopenko

    () (Complex Systems Research Group, Faculty of Engineering and IT, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia)

Abstract

This paper generalises the Hawk-Dove evolutionary game by introducing cost sharing ratios for both players, and applies the generalised Hawk-Dove model to conflict management in projects through investigating the stability of Nash equilibria. A model with clashing interests between a project owner and a contractor is considered to derive their strategy adaptation given the cost sharing ratios. As expected, the pure Nash equilibria are shown to be dominantly stable while the mixed strategy equilibrium is observed to be unstable, across the range of considered cost sharing ratios. In addition, simulations are conducted on the strategy adaptation and stability of the equilibria under noisy and latent conditions. The obtained results can be used by project managers in optimising their strategy in practice.

Suggested Citation

  • Sheryl Le Chang & Mikhail Prokopenko, 2017. "Instability of Mixed Nash Equilibria in Generalised Hawk-Dove Game: A Project Conflict Management Scenario," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 8(4), pages 1-18, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:8:y:2017:i:4:p:42-:d:113917
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael Caldara & Michael T. McBride & Matthew W. McCarter & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2017. "A Study of the Triggers of Conflict and Emotional Reactions," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 8(2), pages 1-12, April.
    2. Oprea, Ryan & Henwood, Keith & Friedman, Daniel, 2011. "Separating the Hawks from the Doves: Evidence from continuous time laboratory games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2206-2225.
    3. Giuseppe Attanasi & Aurora GarcĂ­a-Gallego & Nikolaos GeorgantzĂ­s & Aldo Montesano, 2015. "Bargaining over Strategies of Non-Cooperative Games," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 6(3), pages 1-26, August.
    4. repec:gam:jgames:v:8:y:2017:i:2:p:22-:d:99106 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    evolutionary game theory; project conflict management; Nash equilibrium; Hawk-Dove game;

    JEL classification:

    • C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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