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Balanced Weights and Three-Sided Coalition Formation

Author

Listed:
  • Emiliya Lazarova

    (Management School, Queen’s University Belfast, 25 University Square, Belfast BT7 1NN, UK)

  • Dinko Dimitrov

    () (Faculty of Law and Economics, Saarland University, Campus C3 1, 66123 Saarbruecken, Germany)

Abstract

We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always exists, provided that the corresponding weights are balanced and each agent perceives the two types of status as being substitutable.

Suggested Citation

  • Emiliya Lazarova & Dinko Dimitrov, 2010. "Balanced Weights and Three-Sided Coalition Formation," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 1(2), pages 1-9, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:1:y:2010:i:2:p:159-167:d:8791
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    core; hedonic games; three-sided matching;

    JEL classification:

    • C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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