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Reforming deposit insurance and FDICIA


  • Robert A. Eisenbeis
  • Larry D. Wall


Current discussions about deposit insurance reform center on issues such as the size of insurance premiums, the size of the fund, and the size of the coverage limits-all issues that reflect a concern with how to allocate the losses arising from bank failures. The authors of this article argue that such issues, while important, do not affect the performance of the deposit insurance system nor should they be the focus of deposit insurance reform. They suggest that reform efforts should be directed toward strengthening the incentives to enforce the least cost resolution provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA). ; The authors make the case that the large losses the FDIC has borne with some bank failures were due to supervisory forbearance. They suggest that a useful step forward would be to carry out FDICIA's mandate to develop and implement market value-type disclosures of the value of banks' assets and liabilities. Increasing the transparency of bank risk taking, as academics have long argued, would improve regulators' ability to monitor bank risk exposure. These reforms, combined with a different approach to risk-based premiums and measures to strengthen market discipline, such as expanded use of subordinated debt, merit further consideration as potential partial solutions to the problem of implementing FDICIA.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert A. Eisenbeis & Larry D. Wall, 2002. "Reforming deposit insurance and FDICIA," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q1, pages 1-16.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedaer:y:2002:i:q1:p:1-16:n:v.87no.1

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Wall, Larry D. & Peterson, David R., 1990. "The effect of Continental Illinois' failure on the financial performance of other banks," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 77-99, August.
    2. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    3. William M. Isaac, 2000. "Financial reform's unfinished agenda: a look at deposit insurance funds," The Region, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Mar, pages 34-37.
    4. Dusan Stojanovic & Mark D. Vaughan & Timothy J. Yeager, 2000. "Is federal home loan bank funding a risky business for the FDIC?," The Regional Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Oct, pages 4-9.
    5. James, Christopher, 1991. " The Losses Realized in Bank Failures," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1223-1242, September.
    6. Larry D. Wall, 1997. "Taking note of the deposit insurance fund: a plan for the FDIC to issue capital notes," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q 1, pages 14-30.
    7. Alan Greenspan, 2001. "The financial safety net," Proceedings 701, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    8. Robert A. Eisenbeis, 1997. "Bank deposits and credit as sources of systemic risk," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q 3, pages 4-19.
    9. Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, 2000. "Subordinated debt as bank capital: a proposal for regulatory reform," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q II, pages 40-53.
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    Cited by:

    1. Antoine Martin, 2003. "A guide to deposit insurance reform," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q I, pages 29-54.
    2. Philipp Bagus & David Howden, 2016. "The economic and legal significance of “full” deposit availability," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 243-254, February.
    3. Therese M. Vaughan, 2009. "The Implications of Solvency II for U.S. Insurance Regulation," NFI Policy Briefs 2009-PB-03, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
    4. Robert A. Eisenbeis, 2004. "Agency problems and goal conflicts," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2004-24, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    5. W. Scott Frame & Larry D. Wall, 2002. "Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's voluntary initiatives: Lessons from banking," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q1, pages 45-59.
    6. Akhigbe, Aigbe & Whyte, Ann Marie, 2012. "Does the use of stock incentives influence the payout policy of financial institutions?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 63-71.
    7. Robert A. Eisenbeis & George G. Kaufman, 2007. "Cross-border banking: challenges for deposit insurance and financial stability in the European Union," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    8. Clas Wihlborg, 2012. "Developing Distress Resolution Procedures for Financial Institutions," SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum, number 2012/5.
    9. Eisenbeis, Robert A. & Kaufman, George G., 2008. "Cross-border banking and financial stability in the EU," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 168-204, September.
    10. Therese M. Vaughan, 2008. "The Implications of Prompt Corrective Action for Insurance Firms," NFI Policy Briefs 2008-PB-02, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
    11. Hein, Scott E. & Koch, Timothy W. & Nounamo, Chrislain, 2012. "Moving FDIC insurance to an asset-based assessment system: Evidence from the special assessment of 2009," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 24-36.
    12. Loveland, Robert, 2016. "How prompt was regulatory corrective action during the financial crisis?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 16-36.
    13. Dwight Jaffee & Alexei Tchistyi & Boris Albul, 2013. "Contingent Convertible Bonds and Capital Structure Decisions," 2013 Meeting Papers 682, Society for Economic Dynamics.

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    Bank supervision ; Deposit insurance;


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