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El intangible como problema conceptual y la ficción del valor razonable

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  • Alfonso Galindo Lucas

Abstract

La contabilización de los activos intangibles es conveniente para la empresa, en un enfoque institucional, pero no encuentra necesariamente una justificación teórica válida. En el supuesto de información perfecta y empresa en funcionamiento, se demuestra que el concepto de intangible representa un problema teórico. En la vida real, en que a veces dicha información ni siquiera existe, ni se dan otros supuestos teóricos, la obtención del “valor razonable” de dichos activos se convierte en una ficción contable (y por lo tanto fiscal). Otro problema célebre, el de los activos materiales fijos, se añade a la idea de que ninguna empresa es rentable, desde el punto de vista teórico.

Suggested Citation

  • Alfonso Galindo Lucas, 2007. "El intangible como problema conceptual y la ficción del valor razonable," Contribuciones a la Economía, Servicios Académicos Intercontinentales SL, issue 2007-02, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:erv:contri:y:2007:i:2007-02:62d29920c5a0b01da021baff5a94ca31
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    2. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(2), pages 387-432.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    La contabilización de los activos intangibles es conveniente para la empresa; en un enfoque institucional; pero no encuentra necesariamente una justificación teórica válida. En el supuesto de información perfecta y empresa en funcionamiento; se demuestra que el concepto de intangible representa un problema teórico. En la vida real; en que a veces dicha información ni siquiera existe; ni se dan otros supuestos teóricos; la obtención del “valor razonable” de dichos activos se convierte en una ficción contable (y por lo tanto fiscal). Otro problema célebre; el de los activos materiales fijos; se añade a la idea de que ninguna empresa es rentable; desde el punto de vista teórico.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • M19 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Other
    • B59 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Other
    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles

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