The dual role of the government: securities market regulation in China 1980-2007
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the evolution of China's securities market regulation from 1980 to 2007 and the dual role of the government in this process. Design/methodology/approach – When the government is simultaneously the owner and regulator of the securities market, the evolution of securities market regulation follows a path of compulsory institutional change. China's Government authorities have played a dual role in this process by acting both as the securities market regulator and the controlling owner of the stock exchanges. The paper uses the evolution of China's securities market regulation from 1980 to 2007 to illustrate this theoretical framework. Findings – Using the case of China, this paper provides unique evidence of how securities regulation evolves in response to government direction and supervision if the government is both the owner and the regulator of the securities market. Originality/value – The paper offers insight into issues of securities market regulation in China and other emerging markets.
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Volume (Year): 18 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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- G. William Schwert, 1977. "Public Regulation of National Securities Exchanges: A Test of the Capture Hypothesis," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(1), pages 128-150, Spring.
- Jarrell, Gregg A, 1981. "The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New Security Issues," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 613-75, December.
- Macey, Jonathan R & O'Hara, Maureen, 1999. "Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: A Law and Economics Perspective," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 17-54, January.
- Schwert, G William, 1981. "Using Financial Data to Measure Effects of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 121-58, April.
- Peltzman, Sam, 1993. "George Stigler's Contribution to the Economic Analysis of Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(5), pages 818-32, October.
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