Why Chinese listed companies frequently switch lead underwriters in seasoned equity offerings: A perspective of listed companies' loyalty
Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to explore the reasons for the high-frequency switches of lead underwriters by Chinese listed companies in their seasoned equity offerings. It contributes to the literature by filling the gap and providing evidence that institutional and non-market factors could affect listed companies' decisions to switch their lead underwriters in the Chinese capital market. Design/methodology/approach - This paper employs a numerical measure of listed companies' loyalty to evaluate their frequency of switching lead underwriters, and employs a Findings - It is observed that the frequency of switching lead underwriters is very high among Chinese listed companies for their seasoned offerings. It is also found that underwriters' deficient reputation and the lack of industrial experience, together with the depreciation of relationship-specific assets, could have important impacts on lead underwriters being frequently switched in China. Besides, the frequent switches of lead underwriters could also be attributable to the non-market supervision and regulatory influences by Chinese authorities over the security underwriting market. Originality/value - This paper could help further the understanding of the factors that could explain the listed companies' frequent switches of their lead underwriters for their seasoned offerings in China. In addition, this paper has policy implications on how to improve the listed companies' loyalty for regulators in China. These implications could help improve the regulatory environment and promote the overall performance of the Chinese security underwriting market.
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Volume (Year): 1 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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References listed on IDEAS
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