A model of microfinance with adverse selection, loan default, and self-financing
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- Lin He, 2012. "Credit NGOs' sustainability in rural financial market: a SWOT analysis on DAYBANG," Humanomics: The International Journal of Systems and Ethics, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 28(3), pages 200-208, August.
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KeywordsLoans; Default; Developing countries; Game theory;
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