Environmental Policies and Mergers’ Externalities
A Cournot oligopolistic setting model of trade is characterized by local and foreign firms competing in the presence of pollution quota and tax. Local firms are foreign-owned (FDI) and repatriate their profits. First, we analyze the impact on welfare given by the merger of the local firms, as a response to external firms’ competition and pollution abatement costs. Second, when merger is welfare decreasing, we study the best response of the government in order to compensate this negative externality. Finally, we compare the pollution quota and tax in order to determine their efficiency as a policy instrument.
Volume (Year): XVI (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (January-June)
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