The Economic Analysis of Constitutions: Fatalism Versus Vitalism
We review the claim that the field of political economy has witnessed a quantum leap with Torsten Persson and Guido TabelliniÂ´s The Economic Effects of Constitutions. We find that the approach of Persson and Tabellini suffers from the neglect of previous research, notably in public choice tradition, a lack of a meaningful point of reference, and the disregard of individual liberty as a guiding principle. Their approach has only limited value for formulating, exploring, and judging institutional reforms, particularly reforms outside narrow bounds around the status quo of the liberal democracies.
Volume (Year): 4 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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- Daron Acemoglu, 2005. "Constitutions, Politics and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's "The Economic Effect of Constitutions"," NBER Working Papers 11235, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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