AEA Ideology: Campaign Contributions of American Economic Association Members, Committee Members, Officers, Editors, Referees, Authors, and Acknowledgees
This paper investigates the 2004-election-cycle campaign contributions of the leadership of the American Economic Association. By cross-checking a name with an occupation, employer, and address, I develop a contribution profile for a sample of 2,000 AEA members, then use this profile as a benchmark to examine contributions of editors, referees, authors, and acknowledgees of the 2003 and 2004 issues of the American Economic Review, Journal of Economic Literature, and Journal of Economic Perspectives. Association members were 5 times more likely to give to Democrats than to Republicans. American Economic Review authors appearing in regular issues were about 9 times more likely. Authors in the discretionary AEA publications were 38 times more likely. I find that in those publications where the editors have more discretion in choosing authors, author contributions look more like those of the editors and less like those of the members. For the various forms of leadershipâ€”officers, committee members, and editorsâ€”I generally find ratios more lopsided than among the regular membership. Remarkably few contributed to Republican campaigns. Such ratios challenge the American Economic Associationâ€™s claim that â€œwidely different issues are given a hearing in its annual meetings and through its publication,â€ and its suggestion that the Association represents â€œpeople of all shades of economic opinion.â€
Volume (Year): 3 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Enterprise Hall, Room 354, 4400 University Drive, 3G4 Fairfax, VA 22030|
Phone: (703) 993-1151
Web page: https://econjwatch.org/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder, 2003. "Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?," NBER Working Papers 9409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daniel B. Klein, 2006. "Sense and Sensibilities: Myrdal's Plea for Self-Disclosure and Some Disclosures on AEA Members," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 3(1), pages 180-205, January.
- Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr, 2003. "Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter.
- William McEachern, 1987. "Federal advisory commissions in an economic model of representative democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 41-62, January.
- Levitt, Steven D, 1994. "Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 777-98, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ejw:journl:v:3:y:2006:i:1:p:148-179. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jason Briggeman)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.