Taxing Options: Do Ceos Respond To Favorable Tax Treatment Of Stock Options?
CEO stock option compensation increased tremendously during the 1990s. During this period, the spread between the marginal income and capital gains tax rates increased substantially, creating the potential for tax avoidance. Using ExecuComp data from 1992-2000, we estimate CEOs’ responsiveness to changes in these tax rates. Our findings show that an increase in the marginal income and a decrease in the capital gains tax rate create a significant increase in stock option compensation. Furthermore, the impact of the marginal income tax rate is more than twice that of the capital gains tax rate, which contradicts previous studies.
Volume (Year): 33 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (Summer)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (201) 684-7346
Web page: http://www.ramapo.edu/eea/journal.html
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Woodbury, Stephen A, 1983. "Substitution between Wage and Nonwage Benefits," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(1), pages 166-82, March.
- Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1998.
"Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 113(3), pages 653-691, August.
- Jonathan M. Siegel & Alan J. Auerbach, 2000.
"Capital-Gains Realizations of the Rich and Sophisticated,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 276-282, May.
- Alan J. Auerbach & Jonathan M. Siegel, 2000. "Capital Gains Realizations of the Rich and Sophisticated," NBER Working Papers 7532, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Austan Goolsbee, 2000.
"What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from Executive Compensation,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 352-378, April.
- Austan Goolsbee, 1997. "What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from Executive Compensation," NBER Working Papers 6333, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dhillon, Upinder S. & Ramirez, Gabriel G., 1994. "Employee stock ownership and corporate control: An empirical study," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 9-25, January.
- Mehran, Hamid, 1995. "Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 163-184, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eej:eeconj:v:33:y:2007:i:3:p:343-357. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Victor Matheson, College of the Holy Cross)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.