Corporate governance and firm performance in Russia: an empirical study
Using the agency and institutional perspectives, this study advances several hypotheses about the board structure-firm performance relationship within Russia. We tested these hypotheses using survey data. Despite a relatively small sample size, predictions from both theoretical perspectives were supported. Specifically, we found a negative relationship between "informal" CEO duality and firm performance. This finding is noteworthy given the 1996 Russian Federal law which prohibits the CEO from also serving as board chair. Also, we found that the more vigorously the firm pursues a retrenchment strategy, the more negative the relationship between proportion of inside directors and firm performance. Overall, these findings suggest that effective corporate governance may be essential to firm performance in Russia.
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Volume (Year): 38 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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