IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/wdevel/v142y2021ics0305750x21000632.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Water scarcity & procedural justice in Honduras: Community-based management meets market-based policy

Author

Listed:
  • Grillos, Tara
  • Zarychta, Alan
  • Nelson Nuñez, Jami

Abstract

Ensuring adequate access to clean water remains a major challenge throughout the world, particularly in rural areas of the Global South. Community-based management (CBM) has been a common policy response to this challenge, whereby communities gain decision-making power over their own natural resources, and are also responsible for financial and technical issues. Household water metering is increasingly proposed as a complement to CBM because it facilitates transparency of use and provides the option of pay-per-use pricing, both of which are thought to help support the sustainable management of water supplies. However, metering and use-based fees are controversial and their implementation across various contexts has led to strong backlash that can undermine the management of community water systems. Drawing on ideas of procedural justice, we conducted a survey experiment with 689 residents across 12 communities in Honduras’ “dry corridor” to examine individual perceptions of the decision process for choosing to implement metering, or not, within the context of CBM. Our results show that more inclusive decision-making leads to higher perceived fairness of the process and appropriateness of the metering decision, irrespective of whether the individual personally agrees with the final decision. While inclusion matters in general, whether that takes the form of voting or deliberation did not make a large difference. The effect of inclusion was stronger among those who already agreed with the decision outcome. Finally, inclusion also had positive spillover effects on more technocratic outcomes, namely ratings of how effective and sustainable the resulting management of the water system was expected to be. This research suggests that the backlash observed against water metering projects around the world may have more to do with procedural injustice in decision-making than with resistance to metering itself.

Suggested Citation

  • Grillos, Tara & Zarychta, Alan & Nelson Nuñez, Jami, 2021. "Water scarcity & procedural justice in Honduras: Community-based management meets market-based policy," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:142:y:2021:i:c:s0305750x21000632
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105451
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X21000632
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105451?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Price, Kenneth H. & Hall, Thomas W. & van den Bos, Kees & Hunton, James E. & Lovett, Steve & Tippett, Mark J., 2001. "Features of the Value Function for Voice and Their Consistency across Participants from Four Countries: Great Britain, Mexico, The Netherlands, and the United States," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 95-121, January.
    2. Rui Wang & James S. Fishkin & Robert C. Luskin, 2020. "Does Deliberation Increase Public‐Spiritedness?," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2163-2182, October.
    3. Elinor Ostrom & Roy Gardner, 1993. "Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 93-112, Fall.
    4. Catherine M. Tucker, 2014. "Creating equitable water institutions on disputed land: a Honduran case study," Water International, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(2), pages 216-232, March.
    5. Ezzine-de-Blas, Driss & Corbera, Esteve & Lapeyre, Renaud, 2019. "Payments for Environmental Services and Motivation Crowding: Towards a Conceptual Framework," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 434-443.
    6. Mustafa, Daanish & Altz-Stamm, Amelia & Scott, Laura Mapstone, 2016. "Water User Associations and the Politics of Water in Jordan," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 164-176.
    7. Olken, Benjamin A., 2010. "Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 104(2), pages 243-267, May.
    8. Ghazala Mansuri & Vijayendra Rao, 2013. "Localizing Development : Does Participation Work?," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 11859, December.
    9. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, 2000. "Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(3), pages 791-810.
    10. Farrar, Cynthia & Fishkin, James S. & Green, Donald P. & List, Christian & Luskin, Robert C. & Levy Paluck, Elizabeth, 2010. "Disaggregating Deliberation’s Effects: An Experiment within a Deliberative Poll," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(2), pages 333-347, April.
    11. Prokopy, Linda Stalker, 2005. "The relationship between participation and project outcomes: Evidence from rural water supply projects in India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(11), pages 1801-1819, November.
    12. Wong,Susan & Guggenheim,Scott E., 2018. "Community-driven development : myths and realities," Policy Research Working Paper Series 8435, The World Bank.
    13. Agrawal, Arun & Gibson, Clark C., 1999. "Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in Natural Resource Conservation," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 629-649, April.
    14. Tatsuki Ueda & Peter Moffatt, 2013. "A Socially Efficient Water Tariff Under the English Optional Metering Scheme," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 54(4), pages 495-523, April.
    15. Yates, Julian S. & Harris, Leila M., 2018. "Hybrid regulatory landscapes: The human right to water, variegated neoliberal water governance, and policy transfer in Cape Town, South Africa, and Accra, Ghana," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 75-87.
    16. Marks, Sara J. & Davis, Jennifer, 2012. "Does User Participation Lead to Sense of Ownership for Rural Water Systems? Evidence from Kenya," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(8), pages 1569-1576.
    17. Agrawal, Arun & Chhatre, Ashwini & Gerber, Elisabeth R., 2015. "Motivational Crowding in Sustainable Development Interventions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 109(3), pages 470-487, August.
    18. Agarwal, Bina, 2001. "Participatory Exclusions, Community Forestry, and Gender: An Analysis for South Asia and a Conceptual Framework," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(10), pages 1623-1648, October.
    19. Grillos, Tara & Bottazzi, Patrick & Crespo, David & Asquith, Nigel & Jones, Julia P.G., 2019. "In-kind conservation payments crowd in environmental values and increase support for government intervention: A randomized trial in Bolivia," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 1-1.
    20. Brown, Colin Andrew & Pena, João Luiz, 2016. "Water Meters and Monthly Bills Meet Rural Brazilian Communities: Sociological Perspectives on Technical Objects for Water Management," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 149-161.
    21. Vollan, Bjørn, 2008. "Socio-ecological explanations for crowding-out effects from economic field experiments in southern Africa," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(4), pages 560-573, November.
    22. Clark, William C. & van Kerkhoff, Lorrae & Lebel, Louis & Gallopin, Gilberto, 2016. "Crafting Usuable Knowledge for Sustainable Development," Working Paper Series 16-005, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    23. Bruno S. Frey, 1994. "How Intrinsic Motivation is Crowded out and in," Rationality and Society, , vol. 6(3), pages 334-352, July.
    24. LaVanchy, G. Thomas, 2017. "When wells run dry: Water and tourism in Nicaragua," Annals of Tourism Research, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 37-50.
    25. Neblo, Michael A. & Esterling, Kevin M. & Kennedy, Ryan P. & Lazer, David M.J. & Sokhey, Anand E., 2010. "Who Wants To Deliberate—And Why?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 104(3), pages 566-583, August.
    26. K. A. Alfredo & T. O’Garra, 2020. "Preferences for water treatment provision in rural India: comparing communal, pay-per-use, and labour-for-water schemes," Water International, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(2), pages 91-111, February.
    27. Gibson, Clark C. & Andersson, Krister & Ostrom, The late Elinor & Shivakumar, Sujai, 2005. "The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199278855, Decembrie.
    28. Cairns, Maryann R., 2018. "Metering water: Analyzing the concurrent pressures of conservation, sustainability, health impact, and equity in use," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 411-421.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lina Moros & Maria Alejandra Vélez & Alexander Pfaff & Daniela Quintero, 2020. "Effects of Ending Payments for Ecosystem Services: removal does not crowd prior conservation out," Documentos CEDE 18590, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    2. Moros, Lina & Vélez, María Alejandra & Quintero, Daniela & Tobin, Danny & Pfaff, Alexander, 2023. "Temporary PES do not crowd-out and may crowd-in lab-in-the-field forest conservation in Colombia," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 204(PA).
    3. Grillos, Tara & Bottazzi, Patrick & Crespo, David & Asquith, Nigel & Jones, Julia P.G., 2019. "In-kind conservation payments crowd in environmental values and increase support for government intervention: A randomized trial in Bolivia," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 1-1.
    4. Moros, Lina & Vélez, María Alejandra & Corbera, Esteve, 2019. "Payments for Ecosystem Services and Motivational Crowding in Colombia's Amazon Piedmont," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 468-488.
    5. Cairns, Maryann R., 2018. "Metering water: Analyzing the concurrent pressures of conservation, sustainability, health impact, and equity in use," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 411-421.
    6. Calzada, Joan & Iranzo, Susana, 2021. "Can communal systems work? The effects of communal water provision on child health in Peru," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    7. Brennan, Michael & Rondón-Sulbarán, Janeet, 2019. "Transdisciplinary research: Exploring impact, knowledge and quality in the early stages of a sustainable development project," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 481-491.
    8. Barde, Julia Alexa, 2017. "What Determines Access to Piped Water in Rural Areas? Evidence from Small-Scale Supply Systems in Rural Brazil," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 88-110.
    9. Julia Alexa Barde, 2014. "What Determines Access to Piped Water in Rural Areas?Evidence from Small-scale Supply Systems in Rural Brazil," Discussion Paper Series 30, Department of International Economic Policy, University of Freiburg, revised Dec 2014.
    10. Handberg, Øyvind Nystad & Angelsen, Arild, 2019. "Pay little, get little; pay more, get a little more: A framed forest experiment in Tanzania," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 454-467.
    11. Malin Hasselskog, 2020. "What happens to local participation when national ownership gets stronger? Initiating an exploration in Rwanda and Cambodia," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 38(S1), pages 91-111, May.
    12. Oniki, Shunji & Berhe, Melaku & Negash, Teklay & Etsay, Haftu, 2023. "Do economic incentives crowd out motivation for communal land conservation in Ethiopia?," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    13. Prakash Kashwan, 2016. "Integrating power in institutional analysis: A micro-foundation perspective," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 28(1), pages 5-26, January.
    14. Adeyeye, Yemi & Hagerman, Shannon & Pelai, Ricardo, 2019. "Seeking procedural equity in global environmental governance: Indigenous participation and knowledge politics in forest and landscape restoration debates at the 2016 World Conservation Congress," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    15. Ricks, Jacob I., 2016. "Building Participatory Organizations for Common Pool Resource Management: Water User Group Promotion in Indonesia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 34-47.
    16. Auerbach, Adam Michael, 2017. "Neighborhood Associations and the Urban Poor: India’s Slum Development Committees," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 119-135.
    17. Madajewicz, Malgosia & Tompsett, Anna & Habib, Md. Ahasan, 2021. "How does delegating decisions to communities affect the provision and use of a public service? Evidence from a field experiment in Bangladesh," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    18. Nourani, Vesall & Maertens, Annemie & Michelson, Hope, 2021. "Public good provision and democracy: Evidence from an experiment with farmer groups in Malawi," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    19. d'Adda, Giovanna, 2011. "Motivation crowding in environmental protection: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(11), pages 2083-2097, September.
    20. Grillos, Tara, 2017. "Economic vs non-material incentives for participation in an in-kind payments for ecosystem services program in Bolivia," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 178-190.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:142:y:2021:i:c:s0305750x21000632. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.