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On-line spectrum auctions in TV white spaces for supporting mobile services—A practical manual

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  • Parzy, Marcin
  • Bogucka, Hanna

Abstract

This paper considers an approach for dynamic short-term spectrum leasing in TV white spaces (TVWS) using an on-line auction. The secondary spectrum market discussed here is organized by a central entity called the spectrum broker. The auctioned spectrum appears in blocks of available DVB-T channels with some transmit power constraints set-up to protect the primary users (DVB-T receivers). The bidders are institutional spectrum operators (telecommunication companies or service providers), operating in a given area. These players are characterized by heterogeneous demands concerning the spectrum bandwidth, the operation period with temporarily-exclusive rights for using the spectrum and the transmit power needed for successful transmission. Thus, the auctioned objects are non-identical and present different value for different players. Two auction models are proposed. The first one is the simultaneous auction in time domain and combinatorial in frequency and power dimension. The second proposed auction is fully combinatorial. Simulations results are also provided showing effectiveness of the analyzed auctions (high spectrum utilization ratio) and relation between the players’ satisfaction, their spectrum valuation and varying competition. Finally the guidelines concerning the spectrum auctions in TVWS for the policy makers are proposed.

Suggested Citation

  • Parzy, Marcin & Bogucka, Hanna, 2013. "On-line spectrum auctions in TV white spaces for supporting mobile services—A practical manual," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 219-230.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:telpol:v:37:y:2013:i:2:p:219-230
    DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2012.06.018
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
    2. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    3. Weiss, Martin B.H. & Altamimi, Mohammed & Cui, Liu, 2012. "Spatio-temporal spectrum modeling: Taxonomy and economic evaluation of context acquisition," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 335-348.
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    Cited by:

    1. Akhtar, Fayaz & Rehmani, Mubashir Husain & Reisslein, Martin, 2016. "White space: Definitional perspectives and their role in exploiting spectrum opportunities," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 319-331.

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    Keywords

    Spectrum auction; TV white spaces;

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