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Changing standards for drug approval: A longitudinal analysis of conditional marketing authorisation in the European Union

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  • Hoekman, Jarno
  • Boon, Wouter

Abstract

Drug regulatory agencies around the world increasingly implement expedited regulatory pathways allowing for approval of medicines that intend to address unmet medical needs based on lower evidentiary standards than would be conventionally required. Few studies have investigated how companies and regulators utilise these pathways. We therefore conducted a longitudinal analysis of the emergence and implementation of the conditional marketing authorisation (CMA) instrument in the European Union. Drawing on archival documents, procedural data and interviews, we show that there was substantial ambiguity among regulators and companies about how to strike a new balance between evidentiary requirements and patient needs. As ambiguities were left unresolved, parties became reluctant to use CMA and in the majority of procedures did not use the pathway in a prospectively planned fashion. Rather, CMA became an option for regulators and companies to apply when submitted data were not strong enough to justify standard approval. Particularly, incumbent companies profited from this. The results stress the challenges of realising institutional change in drug regulation by showing how interest-driven actors can act upon ambiguities in attempts to shape regulatory outcomes and stretch rule interpretations.

Suggested Citation

  • Hoekman, Jarno & Boon, Wouter, 2019. "Changing standards for drug approval: A longitudinal analysis of conditional marketing authorisation in the European Union," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 222(C), pages 76-83.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:socmed:v:222:y:2019:i:c:p:76-83
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2018.12.025
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    1. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    2. Christoph Ossege, 2015. "Driven by Expertise and Insulation? The Autonomy of European Regulatory Agencies," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 3(1), pages 101-113.
    3. Carpenter, Daniel P., 2004. "Protection without Capture: Product Approval by a Politically Responsive, Learning Regulator," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(4), pages 613-631, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Anna Chorniy & James Bailey & Abdulkadir Civan & Michael Maloney, 2021. "Regulatory review time and pharmaceutical research and development," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(1), pages 113-128, January.
    2. Shai Mulinari & Andreas Vilhelmsson & Emily Rickard & Piotr Ozieranski, 2020. "Five years of pharmaceutical industry funding of patient organisations in Sweden: Cross-sectional study of companies, patient organisations and drugs," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(6), pages 1-19, June.
    3. Vokinger, Kerstin Noëlle & Kesselheim, Aaron S., 2019. "Characteristics of trials and regulatory pathways leading to US approval of innovative vs. non-innovative oncology drugs," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 123(8), pages 721-727.

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