IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/riibaf/v66y2023ics0275531923001733.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Mandatory minimum dividend, agency problems, and corporate investment

Author

Listed:
  • Kirch, Guilherme
  • Vancin, Daniel Francisco

Abstract

This study aims to better understand the adverse consequences of mandatory dividend rules. Specifically, we identify two main reasons why some firms only pay the mandatory minimum dividend: financial constraints and private benefits. We also argue that the consequences of these rules for firms should depend on the reasons behind their choice to only pay the minimum dividend. Using a sample of publicly traded Brazilian companies and multivariate regressions, we find strong evidence that financially constrained firms are more likely to only pay the minimum dividend, with weak evidence that firms whose managers who use the dividend decision to enjoy private benefits are more likely to only pay the minimum dividend. Moreover, and consistent with our expectations, firms that only pay the mandatory minimum dividend due to financial constraints tend to have a higher value attached to their cash holdings, and they tend to reduce investments more intensely in response to shocks that increase the cost of external financing. Thus, we conclude that mandatory dividend rules can adversely affect some firms and that more flexible rules should be considered.

Suggested Citation

  • Kirch, Guilherme & Vancin, Daniel Francisco, 2023. "Mandatory minimum dividend, agency problems, and corporate investment," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:66:y:2023:i:c:s0275531923001733
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2023.102047
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0275531923001733
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.ribaf.2023.102047?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:66:y:2023:i:c:s0275531923001733. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ribaf .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.