On atmosphere externality and corrective taxes
It has been argued that in the presence of an ’Atmosphere Externality’ and competitive behavior by households, a uniform commodity tax on the externality - generating good attains the first best. It is demonstrated, however, that if income redistribution is desirable then personalized taxes are required for a second-best optimum. Each of these taxes is the sum of a uniform (across households) tax and a component, positive or negative, which depends on the household’s income and demand elasticities. Second-best optimal indirect taxes and rules for investment in externality-reducing measures are also considered.
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- Lau, Lawrence J & Sheshinski, Eytan & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1978. "Efficiency in the Optimum Supply of Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 269-84, March.
- Sheshinski, Eytan & Green, Jerry, 1976.
"Direct Versus Indirect Remedies for Externalities,"
3204666, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- John S. Chipman, 1970. "External Economies of Scale and Competitive Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 347-385.
- Masahiko Aoki, 2013.
"Marshallian External Economies And Optimal Tax-Subsidy Structure,"
in: Comparative Institutional Analysis, chapter 2, pages 5-17
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Aoki, Masahiko, 1971. "Marshallian External Economies and Optimal Tax-Subsidy Structure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(1), pages 35-53, January.
- Peter A. Diamond, 1973. "Consumption Externalities and Imperfect Corrective Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 4(2), pages 526-538, Autumn.
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