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Do remote meetings and board hierarchy impact the voting behavior of independent board directors?

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  • Ma, Li
  • Li, Jiazhu

Abstract

Drawing on a comprehensive sample of board meetings from Chinese listed companies between 2005 and 2022, this study systematically investigates the impact of remote board meetings on the voting behavior of independent directors. The findings indicate that, relative to traditional face-to-face meetings, remote meetings significantly increase the likelihood of independent directors expressing dissent. Further analysis of the underlying mechanisms reveals that remote meetings foster dissenting behavior by reducing independent directors' perceived power distance and enhancing their diligence in fulfilling their duties. Additionally, the effect of remote meetings on dissenting behavior is more pronounced in companies with greater board-level hierarchical divergence, characterized by lower independent director compensation, greater internal pay disparity, weaker informal hierarchies, and higher board shareholding. Finally, remote board meetings also have a spillover effect, improving the diligence of independent directors in other boards where they hold concurrent directorships.

Suggested Citation

  • Ma, Li & Li, Jiazhu, 2025. "Do remote meetings and board hierarchy impact the voting behavior of independent board directors?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:90:y:2025:i:c:s0927538x25000356
    DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2025.102698
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Virtual remote meetings; Board of directors; Independent directors; Dissenting behavior;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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