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Fraud deterrence in dynamic Mirrleesian economies

Listed author(s):
  • Armenter, Roc
  • Mertens, Thomas M.

Insurance schemes rely on legal consequences to deter fraud and tax evasion. This observation guides us to introduce random state verification in a dynamic economy with private information. With some probability, an agent's skill becomes known to the planner who prescribes punishments to misreporting agents. Deferring consumption can ease the provision of incentives creating a motive for subsidizing savings. In an infinite horizon economy, the constrained-efficient allocation converges to high consumption, full insurance, and no labor distortions for any positive probability of state verification.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304393212001419
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Monetary Economics.

Volume (Year): 60 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 139-151

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Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:60:y:2013:i:2:p:139-151
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2012.11.001
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505566

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