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Comment on “How to fund unemployment insurance with informality and false claims: Evidence from Senegal” by Ndiaye, Herkenhoff, Cissé, Dell’Acqua, and Mbaye

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  • Birinci, Serdar

Abstract

This is a comment on “How to Fund Unemployment Insurance with Informality and False Claims: Evidence from Senegal,” by Ndiaye, Herkenhoff, Cissé, Dell’Acqua, and Mbaye.

Suggested Citation

  • Birinci, Serdar, 2025. "Comment on “How to fund unemployment insurance with informality and false claims: Evidence from Senegal” by Ndiaye, Herkenhoff, Cissé, Dell’Acqua, and Mbaye," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:150:y:2025:i:c:s0304393224001533
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2024.103700
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ndiaye, Abdoulaye & Herkenhoff, Kyle & Cissé, Abdoulaye & Dell’Acqua, Alessandro & Mbaye, Ahmadou A., 2025. "How to fund unemployment insurance with informality and false claims: Evidence from Senegal," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    2. Chetty, Raj, 2006. "A general formula for the optimal level of social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 1879-1901, November.
    3. Marek Ignaszak & Philip Jung & Keith Kuester, 2020. "Federal unemployment reinsurance and local labor-market policies," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 040, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    4. Hansen, Gary D & Imrohoroglu, Ayse, 1992. "The Role of Unemployment Insurance in an Economy with Liquidity Constraints and Moral Hazard," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(1), pages 118-142, February.
    5. Raj Chetty, 2008. "Erratum: Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(6), pages 1197-1197, December.
    6. Serdar Birinci & Kurt See, 2023. "Labor Market Responses to Unemployment Insurance: The Role of Heterogeneity," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(3), pages 388-430, July.
    7. Nakajima, Makoto, 2012. "A quantitative analysis of unemployment benefit extensions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(7), pages 686-702.
    8. Robert Shimer & Ivan Werning, 2008. "Liquidity and Insurance for the Unemployed," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(5), pages 1922-1942, December.
    9. Serdar Birinci & Kurt See, 2024. "The Implications of Labor Market Heterogeneity for Unemployment Insurance Design," Working Papers 2024-026, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, revised 23 Jan 2026.
    10. Lars Ljungqvist & Thomas J. Sargent, 2008. "Two Questions about European Unemployment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(1), pages 1-29, January.
    11. Mitman, Kurt & Rabinovich, Stanislav, 2015. "Optimal unemployment insurance in an equilibrium business-cycle model," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 99-118.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • J46 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Informal Labor Market
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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