A stochastic differential game of capitalism
We develop a stochastic differential game of capitalism to analyze the role of uncertainty. In the deterministic game, the firm's rent is completely taxed away and the firm stops investing completely. In the stochastic game, the government does not tax the firm's rent completely. The firm posts a positive rate of investment if the firm's rent exceeds the labor's income. Although the cooperative solution is indeterminate, cooperation is always Pareto optimal compared to the non-cooperative Markovian Nash equilibrium. For individual rationality, we apply a payoff distribution procedure based on Yeung and Petrosyan (2006) to derive a subgame-consistent solution.
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- Fwu-Ranq Chang & A. G. Malliaris, 2005.
"Asymptotic Growth under Uncertainty: Existence and Uniqueness,"
World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Economic Uncertainty, Instabilities And Asset Bubbles Selected Essays, chapter 1, pages 3-8
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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- Lancaster, Kelvin, 1973. "The Dynamic Inefficiency of Capitalism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(5), pages 1092-1109, Sept.-Oct.
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- Shimomura, Koji, 1991. "The feedback equilibria of a differential game of capitalism," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 317-338, April. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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