From decision problems to dethroned dictators
Economic models as well as aggregation and decision problems with "holes" in the domain can be difficult to analyze because, unexpectedly, they are related to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: embedded within the model may be "topological dictators." But, just as it is possible to remove the negative impact of Arrow's dictator by recognizing that the problem is caused by not using crucial, available information (about voter preferences), the obstacles confronting these economic decision problems can be removed by identifying what kind of available information is not being used.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Saari, Donald G. & Williams, Steven R., 1986. "On the local convergence of economic mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 152-167, October.
- Chichilnisky, Graciela & Heal, Geoffrey, 1979.
"Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox,"
8495, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Oct 1981.
- Chichilnisky, Graciela & Heal, Geoffrey, 1983. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 68-87, October.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521808163 is not listed on IDEAS
- Donald G. Saari, 1997. "Informational geometry of social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 211-232.
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