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On signaling disability in anonymous economic games

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  • Max, Sylvain
  • Grolleau, Gilles
  • Perchot, Rodolphe
  • Sutan, Angela

Abstract

We experimentally tested whether individuals behave differently when they interact with other individuals whose disability is salient in dictator and ultimatum games. We found that participants are more generous and fairer with disabled people, and that this behavior is not strategic. These effects are driven by the specific nature of the disability not by the difference per se. The evidence regarding the effect of acquired versus permanent disability is mixed.

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  • Max, Sylvain & Grolleau, Gilles & Perchot, Rodolphe & Sutan, Angela, 2020. "On signaling disability in anonymous economic games," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:78:y:2020:i:c:s0167487020300295
    DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2020.102272
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    1. Arnaud Tognetti & David Doat & Dimitri Dubois & Rustam Romaniuc, 2022. "The effect of physical disability on group cooperation: Experimental evidence," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(1), pages 308-316, January.
    2. Cochard, François & Flage, Alexandre, 2024. "Sharing losses in dictator and ultimatum games: A meta-analysis," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    3. Merkel, Anna & Vanberg, Christoph, 2023. "Multilateral bargaining with subjective claims under majority vs. unanimity rule: An experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    4. François Cochard & Alexandre Flage, 2023. "Sharing Losses in Dictator and Ultimatum Games: A Meta-Analysis," Working Papers 2023-09, CRESE.
    5. Fatas, Enrique & Restrepo-Plaza, Lina, 2022. "When losses can be a gain. A large lab-in-the-field experiment on reference dependent forgiveness in Colombia," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).

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