IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jfinec/v56y2000i2p153-207.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Controlling stockholders and the disciplinary role of corporate payout policy: a study of the Times Mirror Company

Author

Listed:
  • DeAngelo, Harry
  • DeAngelo, Linda

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • DeAngelo, Harry & DeAngelo, Linda, 2000. "Controlling stockholders and the disciplinary role of corporate payout policy: a study of the Times Mirror Company," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 153-207, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:56:y:2000:i:2:p:153-207
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304-405X(00)00039-8
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dial, Jay & Murphy, Kevin J., 1995. "Incentives, downsizing, and value creation at General Dynamics," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 261-314, March.
    2. Michael C. Jensen, 2010. "The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 43-58, January.
    3. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(2), pages 110-110.
    4. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
    5. Lang, Larry & Poulsen, Annette & Stulz, Rene, 1995. "Asset sales, firm performance, and the agency costs of managerial discretion," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 3-37, January.
    6. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(4), pages 351-351.
    7. Warner, Jerold B. & Watts, Ross L. & Wruck, Karen H., 1988. "Stock prices and top management changes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 461-492, January.
    8. Michael S. Rozeff, 1982. "Growth, Beta And Agency Costs As Determinants Of Dividend Payout Ratios," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 5(3), pages 249-259, September.
    9. Weiss, Lawrence A. & Wruck, Karen H., 1998. "Information problems, conflicts of interest, and asset stripping:: Chapter 1's failure in the case of Eastern Airlines1," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 55-97, April.
    10. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    11. Easterbrook, Frank H, 1984. "Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 650-659, September.
    12. Baker, George P. & Wruck, Karen H., 1989. "Organizational changes and value creation in leveraged buyouts : The case of the O.M. Scott & Sons Company," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 163-190, December.
    13. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
    14. Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, 1961. "Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34, pages 411-411.
    15. Gilson, Stuart C., 1989. "Management turnover and financial distress," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 241-262, December.
    16. Wruck, Karen Hopper, 1994. "Financial policy, internal control, and performance Sealed Air Corporation's leveraged special dividend," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 157-192, October.
    17. Denis, David J., 1994. "Organizational form and the consequences of highly leveraged transactions: Kroger's recapitalization and Safeway's LBO," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 193-224, October.
    18. DeAngelo, Harry & DeAngelo, Linda, 1985. "Managerial ownership of voting rights : A study of public corporations with dual classes of common stock," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 33-69, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Isakov, Dušan & Weisskopf, Jean-Philippe, 2014. "Are founding families special blockholders? An investigation of controlling shareholder influence on firm performance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 1-16.
    2. Hope, Ole-Kristian & Langli, John Christian & Thomas, Wayne B., 2012. "Agency conflicts and auditing in private firms," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 37(7), pages 500-517.
    3. Paolo Santella & Giulia Paone & Carlo Drago, "undated". "How Independent Are Independent Directors? The Case Of Italy," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1148, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    4. Wenyi Chu, 2009. "The influence of family ownership on SME performance: evidence from public firms in Taiwan," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 353-373, October.
    5. Paolo, Santella & Carlo, Drago & Giulia, Paone, 2007. "Who cares about Director Independence?," MPRA Paper 2288, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Kim, Sehoon, 2020. "Disappearing Discounts: Hedge Fund Activism in Conglomerates," MPRA Paper 100876, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Schmid, Thomas & Ampenberger, Markus & Kaserer, Christoph & Achleitner, Ann-Kristin, 2010. "Controlling shareholders and payout policy: do founding families have a special 'taste for dividends'?," CEFS Working Paper Series 2010-01, Technische Universität München (TUM), Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS).
    8. Anderson, Ronald & Hamadi, Malika, 2009. "Large powerful shareholders and cash holding," CEPR Discussion Papers 7291, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Suranjita Mukherjee & Carol Padgett, 2006. "Return Differences Between Family and Non-Family Firms: Absolute and Index Differences," ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance icma-dp2006-11, Henley Business School, University of Reading.
    10. Roberto Barontini & Stefano Bozzi, 2011. "Board compensation and ownership structure: empirical evidence for Italian listed companies," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 15(1), pages 59-89, February.
    11. Boubaker, Sabri & Labégorre, Florence, 2008. "Ownership structure, corporate governance and analyst following: A study of French listed firms," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 961-976, June.
    12. De Massis, Alfredo & Kotlar, Josip, 2014. "The case study method in family business research: Guidelines for qualitative scholarship," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 15-29.
    13. Yu-Lin Chen & Chao-Jung Chen, 2015. "Family firms and the incentive contracting role of accounting earnings," Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(4), pages 384-405, December.
    14. Lious Agbor Tabot Ntoung & Helena Maria Santos de Oliveira & Benjamim Manuel Ferreira de Sousa & Liliana Marques Pimentel & Susana Adelina Moreira Carvalho Bastos, 2019. "Are Family Firms Financially Healthier Than Non-Family Firm?," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 13(1), pages 1-18, December.
    15. P. Du Jardin & E. Séverin, 2011. "Dividend policy," Post-Print hal-00801923, HAL.
    16. Ari Kim & Youkyoung Lee, 2018. "Family firms and corporate social performance: evidence from Korean firms," Asia Pacific Business Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(5), pages 693-713, October.
    17. Sri Murni & Rahmawati Rahmawati & Ari Kuncara Widagdo & Eko Arief Sudaryono & Doddy Setiawan, 2023. "Effect of Family Control on Earnings Management: The Role of Leverage," Risks, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-15, January.
    18. Wenyi Chu, 2011. "Family ownership and firm performance: Influence of family management, family control, and firm size," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 833-851, December.
    19. Claudio A. Bonilla & Mariela Carvajal & Jean Sepúlveda, 2010. "Family Ownership and Firm Performance: A Closer Look at the Evidence from Public Companies in Chile," Serie de Documentos de Trabajo 08, Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros.
    20. DeAngelo, Harry & DeAngelo, Linda & Skinner, Douglas J., 2004. "Are dividends disappearing? Dividend concentration and the consolidation of earnings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 425-456, June.
    21. Anderson, Ronald C & Reeb, David M, 2003. "Founding-Family Ownership, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Leverage," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 653-684, October.
    22. Malika Hamadi & Ronald W. Anderson, 2009. "Large powerful shareholders and cash holding," LSF Research Working Paper Series 09-04, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.
    23. Ginés Hernández-Cánovas & Antonio Mínguez-Vera & Javier Sánchez-Vidal, 2016. "Ownership structure and debt as corporate governance mechanisms: an empirical analysis for Spanish SMEs," Journal of Business Economics and Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(6), pages 960-976, November.
    24. Piruna Polsiri & Kingkarn Sookhanaphibarn, 2009. "Corporate Distress Prediction Models Using Governance and Financial Variables: Evidence from Thai Listed Firms during the East Asian Economic Crisis," Journal of Economics and Management, College of Business, Feng Chia University, Taiwan, vol. 5(2), pages 273-304, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Szilagyi, P.G., 2007. "Corporate governance and the agency costs of debt and outside equity," Other publications TiSEM 9520d40a-224f-43a8-9bf9-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Martin Conyon & Annita Florou, 2002. "Top executive dismissal, ownership and corporate performance," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(4), pages 209-225.
    3. Hussein Abedi Shamsabadi & Byung-Seong Min & Richard Chung, 2016. "Corporate governance and dividend strategy: lessons from Australia," International Journal of Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 12(5), pages 583-610, October.
    4. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2485-2563 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Bushman, Robert M. & Smith, Abbie J., 2001. "Financial accounting information and corporate governance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 237-333, December.
    6. Ernest Gyapong & Ammad Ahmed & Collins G Ntim & Muhammad Nadeem, 2021. "Board gender diversity and dividend policy in Australian listed firms: the effect of ownership concentration," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 603-643, June.
    7. Cotter, James F. & Peck, Sarah W., 2001. "The structure of debt and active equity investors: The case of the buyout specialist," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 101-147, January.
    8. Strickland, Deon & Wiles, Kenneth W. & Zenner, Marc, 1996. "A requiem for the USA Is small shareholder monitoring effective?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 319-338, February.
    9. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    10. Carline, Nicholas F. & Linn, Scott C. & Yadav, Pradeep K., 2014. "Corporate governance and the nature of takeover resistance," CFR Working Papers 14-01, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    11. J. Mulherin, 2005. "Corporations, collective action and corporate governance: One size does not fit all," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 179-204, July.
    12. Céline Du Boys, 2009. "Is payout policy part of the corporate governance system? The case of France," Post-Print hal-01290737, HAL.
    13. du Jardin, Philippe & Séverin, Eric, 2011. "Dividend policy," MPRA Paper 44382, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Szilagyi, P.G., 2006. "How Relevant is Dividend Policy under Low Shareholder Protection?," Other publications TiSEM 70e258ee-7fcd-4c5f-83a2-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    15. Chen, Jie & Song, Wei & Goergen, Marc, 2019. "Passing the dividend baton: The impact of dividend policy on new CEOs' initial compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 458-481.
    16. Muurling, Rutger & Lehnert, Thorsten, 2004. "Option-based compensation: a survey," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 365-401.
    17. Schmid, Thomas & Ampenberger, Markus & Kaserer, Christoph & Achleitner, Ann-Kristin, 2010. "Controlling shareholders and payout policy: do founding families have a special 'taste for dividends'?," CEFS Working Paper Series 2010-01, Technische Universität München (TUM), Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS).
    18. ATM Adnan & Nisar Ahmed, 2019. "The Transformation Of The Corporate Governance Model: A Literature Review," Copernican Journal of Finance & Accounting, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, vol. 8(3), pages 7-47.
    19. Hellwig, Martin, 1998. "On the economics and politics of corporate finance and corporate control," Papers 98-43, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    20. White, Lourdes Ferreira, 1996. "Executive compensation and dividend policy," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 335-358, July.
    21. Sun, Liang & Yu, Huaibing, 2022. "The effects of busy board on firm’s probability to pay dividends," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:56:y:2000:i:2:p:153-207. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.