IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jfinec/v119y2016i2p316-335.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The ownership and trading of debt claims in Chapter 11 restructurings

Author

Listed:
  • Ivashina, Victoria
  • Iverson, Benjamin
  • Smith, David C.

Abstract

Using a novel data set that covers individual debt claims against 136 bankrupt US companies and includes information on a subset of claims transfers, we provide new empirical insight regarding how a firm’s debt ownership relates to bankruptcy outcomes. Firms with higher debt concentration at the start of the case are more likely to file prearranged bankruptcy plans, to move quickly through the restructuring process, and to emerge successfully as independent going concerns. Moreover, higher ownership concentration within a debt class is associated with higher recovery rates to that class. Trading of claims during bankruptcy concentrates ownership further, but this trading is not associated with subsequent improvements in bankruptcy outcomes and could, at the margin, increase the likelihood of liquidation.

Suggested Citation

  • Ivashina, Victoria & Iverson, Benjamin & Smith, David C., 2016. "The ownership and trading of debt claims in Chapter 11 restructurings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 316-335.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:119:y:2016:i:2:p:316-335
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.09.002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X15001695
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.09.002?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1997. "Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 10(3), pages 661-691.
    2. Paul Asquith & Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, 1994. "Anatomy of Financial Distress: An Examination of Junk-Bond Issuers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(3), pages 625-658.
    3. Gilson, Stuart C., 1990. "Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders : Evidence on changes in corporate ownership and control when firms default," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 355-387, October.
    4. Acharya, Viral V. & Bharath, Sreedhar T. & Srinivasan, Anand, 2007. "Does industry-wide distress affect defaulted firms? Evidence from creditor recoveries," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 787-821, September.
    5. Rajan, Raghuram G, 1992. "Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1367-1400, September.
    6. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1996. "Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 1-25, February.
    7. Gertner, Robert & Scharfstein, David, 1991. "A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1189-1222, September.
    8. Dahiya, Sandeep & John, Kose & Puri, Manju & Ramirez, Gabriel, 2003. "Debtor-in-possession financing and bankruptcy resolution: Empirical evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 259-280, July.
    9. Wei Jiang & Kai Li & Wei Wang, 2012. "Hedge Funds and Chapter 11," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(2), pages 513-560, April.
    10. Wilbur N. Moulton & Howard Thomas, 1993. "Bankruptcy as a deliberate strategy: Theoretical considerations and empirical evidence," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(2), pages 125-135, February.
    11. Hendrik Bessembinder & William Maxwell, 2008. "Markets: Transparency and the Corporate Bond Market," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 22(2), pages 217-234, Spring.
    12. Rajan, Raghuram G & Zingales, Luigi, 1995. "What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1421-1460, December.
    13. Steven Drucker & Manju Puri, 2009. "On Loan Sales, Loan Contracting, and Lending Relationships," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(7), pages 2635-2672, July.
    14. Douglas W. Diamond, 1991. "Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(3), pages 709-737.
    15. James, Christopher, 1995. "When Do Banks Take Equity in Debt Restructurings?," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 8(4), pages 1209-1234.
    16. James, Christopher, 1996. "Bank Debt Restructurings and the Composition of Exchange Offers in Financial Distress," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(2), pages 711-727, June.
    17. Gilson, Stuart C. & John, Kose & Lang, Larry H. P., 1990. "Troubled debt restructurings*1: An empirical study of private reorganization of firms in default," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 315-353, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Amanda Carmignani & Massimo Omiccioli, 2007. "Costs and benefits of creditor concentration: An empirical approach," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 645, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    2. Ulrich Hege & Pierre Mella-Barral, 2005. "Repeated Dilution of Diffusely Held Debt," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(3), pages 737-786, May.
    3. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    4. Hege, U. & Mella-Barral, P., 1999. "Collateral, Renegotiation and the Value of Diffusely Held Debt," Other publications TiSEM d1806bd7-b34c-4249-b6fd-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Sarkar, Sudipto, 2013. "Distressed exchange, bargaining power, and prior capital structure," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2695-2709.
    6. Giacinto Micucci & Paola Rossi, 2017. "Debt Restructuring and the Role of Banks’ Organizational Structure and Lending Technologies," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 51(3), pages 339-361, June.
    7. Helwege, Jean & Packer, Frank, 2003. "Determinants of the choice of bankruptcy procedure in Japan," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 96-120, January.
    8. Couwenberg, Oscar & de Jong, Abe, 2006. "It takes two to tango: An empirical tale of distressed firms and assisting banks," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 429-454, December.
    9. Lars Schweizer & Andreas Nienhaus, 2017. "Corporate distress and turnaround: integrating the literature and directing future research," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 10(1), pages 3-47, June.
    10. Demiroglu, Cem & James, Christopher, 2015. "Bank loans and troubled debt restructurings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 192-210.
    11. Hege, Ulrich, 2003. "Workouts, court-supervised reorganization and the choice between private and public debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 233-269, March.
    12. Christina Bannier, 2007. "Heterogeneous multiple bank financing: does it reduce inefficient credit-renegotiation incidences?," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, vol. 21(4), pages 445-470, December.
    13. Nicolae Stef, 2023. "Bankruptcy voting process and corporate reorganization," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(2), pages 508-524, April.
    14. Eirik Gaard Kristiansen, 2005. "Strategic bank monitoring and firms’ debt structure," Working Paper 2005/10, Norges Bank.
    15. Roberts, Michael R. & Sufi, Amir, 2009. "Renegotiation of financial contracts: Evidence from private credit agreements," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 159-184, August.
    16. Mascia Bedendo & Lara Cathcart & Lina El‐Jahel, 2016. "Distressed Debt Restructuring in the Presence of Credit Default Swaps," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(1), pages 165-201, February.
    17. Pagratis, Spyros, 2004. "Co-ordination failure and the role of banks in the resolution of financial distress," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24939, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    18. Daniel Tut, 2022. "Debt dynamic, debt dispersion and corporate governance," International Journal of Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 19(4), pages 744-771, July.
    19. Yao, Wenyun & Lu, Feier & Wang, Yuting & Song, Zilong, 2023. "Social insurance contributions and firms' debt concentration choice: A quasi-natural experiment based on the implementation of China's social insurance law," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    20. Franks, Julian & Sussman, Oren, 2003. "Financial Distress and Bank Restructuring of Small to Medium Size UK Companies," CEPR Discussion Papers 3915, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Chapter 11; Ownership structure; Distressed debt; Trading in bankruptcy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:119:y:2016:i:2:p:316-335. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.