Kernel-based type spaces
Type space is of fundamental importance in epistemic game theory. This paper shows how to build type space if players approach the game in a way advocated by Bernheim's justification procedure. If an agent fixes a strategy profile of her opponents and ponders which of their beliefs about her set of strategies make this profile optimal, such an analysis is represented by kernels and yields disintegrable beliefs. Our construction requires that underlying space is Polish.
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- Friedenberg, Amanda, 2010. "When do type structures contain all hierarchies of beliefs?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 108-129, January.
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