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CEO incentives and bank risk

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  • Acrey, James Cash
  • McCumber, William R.
  • Nguyen, Thu Hien T.

Abstract

We investigate the relationship between CEO compensation and bank default risk predictors to determine if short-term incentives can explain recent excesses in bank risk. We investigate early warning off-site surveillance parameters and expected default frequency (EDF) as well as crisis-related risky bank activities. We find only modest evidence that CEO compensation structures promote significant firm-specific heterogeneity in bank risk measures or risky activities. Compensation elements commonly thought to be the riskiest components, unvested options and bonuses, are either insignificant or negatively correlated with common risk variables, and only positively significant in predicting the level of trading assets and securitization income.

Suggested Citation

  • Acrey, James Cash & McCumber, William R. & Nguyen, Thu Hien T., 2011. "CEO incentives and bank risk," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 63(5), pages 456-471, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:63:y:2011:i:5:p:456-471
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Freddie and the Crisis
      by Jonathan Finegold in Economic Thought on 2012-11-13 19:00:33
    2. The Price of Inequality: the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
      by Jonathan Finegold in Economic Thought on 2012-12-22 22:00:07

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    Cited by:

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    2. Iyad Isbaita, 2020. "Corporate governance in banking institutions," Manager Journal, Faculty of Business and Administration, University of Bucharest, vol. 31(1), pages 75-85, December.
    3. Westman, Hanna, 2014. "Crisis performance of European banks – does management ownership matter?," Research Discussion Papers 28/2014, Bank of Finland.
    4. K. Batu Tunaya & Serhat Yüksel, 2017. "The relationship between corporate governance andforeign ownership of the banks in developing countries," Contaduría y Administración, Accounting and Management, vol. 62(5), pages 25-26, Diciembre.
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    6. Westman, Hanna, 2014. "Crisis performance of European banks – does management ownership matter?," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 28/2014, Bank of Finland.
    7. Jennifer Kunz & Mathias Heitz, 2021. "Banks’ risk culture and management control systems: A systematic literature review," Journal of Management Control: Zeitschrift für Planung und Unternehmenssteuerung, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 439-493, December.

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