How luck and performance affect stealing
This paper investigates how the way of earning payoff affects the probability of stealing. The participants who earned their payoff according to performance were three times more likely to take the (undeserved) maximum payoff than participants with randomly allocated payoff. Conditional on stealing something, most subjects steal the full amount available.
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Volume (Year): 93 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
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