Impact of organizational structure on oligopolistic pricing
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- Cyert, R. & Kumar, P. & Williams, J., 1992. "Impact of Organizational Structure on Oligopolistic Pricing," GSIA Working Papers 1992-51, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
References listed on IDEAS
- Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-396, March.
- Cyert, Richard M & DeGroot, Morris H, 1973. "An Analysis of Cooperation and Learning in a Duopoly Context," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(1), pages 24-37, March.
- Shapiro, Carl, 1989. "Theories of oligopoly behavior," Handbook of Industrial Organization,in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 329-414 Elsevier.
- Bailey, Elizabeth E & Williams, Jeffrey R, 1988. "Sources of Economic Rent in the Deregulated Airline Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 173-202, April.
- Williams, J.R., 1992. "Strategy and the Search for Rents: The Evolution of Diversity Among Firms," GSIA Working Papers 1992-04, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2015.
"Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy,"
Journal of Economics,
Springer, vol. 114(2), pages 153-176, March.
- Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2013. "Hidden collusion by decentralization: firms' organization and antitrust policy," Post-Print halshs-00861216, HAL.
- Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2015. "Hidden collusion by decentralization: firms' organization and antitrust policy," Post-Print halshs-01089716, HAL.
- Connor, John M., 2003. "Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, And Anticartel Enforcement," Staff Papers 28645, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics.
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