IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v219y2024icp490-509.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Territory in the state of nature

Author

Listed:
  • Adamson, Jordan
  • Wilson, Bart J.

Abstract

In this paper we examine territorial behavior in the ecological conditions that foster conflict. We develop an economic model that isolates the effects of resource skew on territorial ranges, as well as their interactions with unequal appropriation abilities. We then conduct a controlled laboratory experiment to test the predictions of our model and find that observed behavior tends to cluster around the equilibrium predictions and that all comparative statics have the predicted sign. Additionally, we find that equally strong appropriators select more exclusive and less overlapping ranges than what is predicted with symmetric resources, while weaker appropriators choose more engulfed ranges than what is predicted with skewed resources.

Suggested Citation

  • Adamson, Jordan & Wilson, Bart J., 2024. "Territory in the state of nature," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 219(C), pages 490-509.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:219:y:2024:i:c:p:490-509
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.01.032
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268124000386
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.01.032?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Territorial range; Resource concentration; Strength asymmetry;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:219:y:2024:i:c:p:490-509. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.