Governance and global communities
Communities are a new form of organization in which volunteers primarily contribute to the creation of economic value. Building upon transaction cost economics, communities are investigated as a fourth form of governance structure. The concept of transaction benefits is introduced to the governance structure equation and some key variables (individual characteristics and needs, information technology, and national culture and policy) influencing transaction benefits are identified. Within communities, four major forms (restrictive, diffusive, inventive and adaptive) are identified based upon dimensions of responsiveness and transaction benefits. We conclude with a discussion of the relationship between communities and other governance structures.
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Volume (Year): 11 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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