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International trade agreements between countries of asymmetric size

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  • Park, Jee-Hyeong

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  • Park, Jee-Hyeong, 2000. "International trade agreements between countries of asymmetric size," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 473-495, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:50:y:2000:i:2:p:473-495
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    1. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1981. "Theoretical Considerations on Negotiated Tariff Adjustments," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(1), pages 135-153, March.
    2. Staiger, Robert W., 1995. "International rules and institutions for trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 29, pages 1495-1551, Elsevier.
    3. Ludema, Rodney D., 2001. "Optimal international trade agreements and dispute settlement procedures," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 355-376, June.
    4. Carlo Perroni & John Whalley, 2000. "The new regionalism: trade liberalization or insurance?," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 33(1), pages 1-24, February.
    5. John Kennan & Raymond Riezman, 2013. "Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Raymond Riezman (ed.), International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 4, pages 45-51, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    7. Campa, Jose Manuel & Sorenson, Timothy L, 1996. " Are Trade Blocs Conducive to Free Trade?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 98(2), pages 263-273, June.
    8. McLaren, John, 1997. "Size, Sunk Costs, and Judge Bowker's Objection to Free Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 400-420, June.
    9. Eric W. Bond & Jee-Hyeong Park, 2002. "Gradualism in Trade Agreements with Asymmetric Countries," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(2), pages 379-406.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Krzysztof Kosiec, 2016. "Liberalisation of International Trade – The Case of Asymmetric Countries," Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, vol. 8(3), pages 143-160, September.
    2. Collie, David R., 2019. "Trade Wars under Oligopoly: Who Wins and is Free Trade Sustainable?," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2019/4, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    3. Difei Geng & Kamal Saggi, 2018. "Is there a case for non-discrimination in the international protection of intellectual property?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Kamal Saggi (ed.), Economic Analysis of the Rules and Regulations of the World Trade Organization, chapter 5, pages 109-123, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Nuno Limão & Kamal Saggi, 2018. "Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Policy Externalities and International Trade Agreements, chapter 12, pages 337-349, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. McCalman, Phillip, 2002. "Multi-lateral trade negotiations and the Most Favored Nation clause," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 151-176, June.
    6. Sauré, Philip, 2014. "Domestic policies in self-enforcing trade agreements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 19-30.
    7. Escaith, Hubert, 2005. "Les petites économies d'Amérique latine et des Caraïbes," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), June.
    8. Mei, Yuan, 2020. "Sustainable cooperation in international trade: A quantitative analysis," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    9. Nuno Limão & Kamal Saggi, 2018. "Size inequality, coordination externalities and international trade agreements," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Policy Externalities and International Trade Agreements, chapter 11, pages 319-336, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    10. Park, Jee-Hyeong, 2009. "Enforcing International Trade Agreements with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Private Trigger Strategies and a Possible Role for the WTO," CCES Discussion Paper Series 19, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    11. Jee-Hyeong Park, 2004. "Sustaining Free Trade with Imperfect Private Information about Non-Tariff Barriers," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 736, Econometric Society.
    12. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:6:y:2008:i:34:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Paolo Epifani & Juliette Vitaloni, 2006. "“GATT‐think” with Asymmetric Countries," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(3), pages 427-444, August.
    14. Prema-chandra Athukorala & Dayaratna Silva, 2019. "The FTA debate in Sri Lanka: Rhetoric and Reality," ASARC Working Papers 2019-03, The Australian National University, Australia South Asia Research Centre.
    15. Gustavo de Souza & Naiyuan Hu & Haishi Li & Yuan Mei, 2022. "(Trade) War and Peace: How to Impose International Trade Sanctions," Working Paper Series WP 2022-49, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    16. Jee-Hyeong Park, 2009. "Enforcing International Trade Agreements with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Private Trigger Strategies and a Possible Role for the WTO," Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series gd09-063, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    17. Martin, Alberto & Vergote, Wouter, 2008. "On the role of retaliation in trade agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 61-77, September.
    18. Park, Jee-Hyeong, 2009. "Enforcing International Trade Agreements with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Private Trigger Strategies and the Possible Role of the WTO," CEI Working Paper Series 2009-14, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    19. Maggi, Giovanni, 2014. "International Trade Agreements," Handbook of International Economics, in: Gopinath, G. & Helpman, . & Rogoff, K. (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 0, pages 317-390, Elsevier.
    20. Kim, Young-Han, 2004. "The optimal trade bargaining strategies in the negotiation of DDA," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 65-80, January.
    21. Escaith, Hubert, 2001. "The small economies of Latin America and the Caribbean," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), August.
    22. Gustavo de Souza & Naiyuan Hu & Haishi Li & Yuan Mei, 2023. "(Trade) War and Peace: How to Impose International Trade Sanctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 10477, CESifo.
    23. Kilolo, Jean-Marc Malambwe, 2013. "Country size, trade liberalization and transfers," MPRA Paper 47996, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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