Investigating transatlantic merger policy convergence
We propose a framework to examine convergence in the jurisdictional patterns of the American FTC and the European Commission. Based on a sample of 595 merger cases scrutinized by either of these agencies in the 1995–2007 period, we estimate logit models of the probability of intervening in a merger for both jurisdictions and use them to predict the decisions of the respectively other agency. The results point to an increasing harmonization of merger regimes and corroborate the theoretical appraisal that the 2004 reform of EU merger law constituted a step towards the US system.
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- Malcolm Coate & Shawn Ulrick, 2009. "Do Court Decisions Drive the Federal Trade Commission’s Enforcement Policy on Merger Settlements?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 99-114, March.
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